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KEEPING THE DANGEROUS BEHIND BARS:  
REDEFINING WHAT A SEXUALLY VIOLENT 
PERSON IS IN ILLINOIS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a man named Mr. Doe slowly driving a car down a 
secluded neighborhood street.1  Mr. Doe has a checkered past.  In 1990, 
at the age of twenty-five, he was arrested after tying his four-year-old 
stepson to a bed.  Mr. Doe’s wife got home from work at about the same 
time, so nothing further happened.  The stepson told his mother, who 
did not believe him.  The stepson then told a preschool teacher who 
alerted police.  The charges were dropped, however, when Mr. Doe’s 
wife convinced her son that he was just imagining things.  Five years and 
a divorce later, Mr. Doe was arrested for sexually assaulting a seven-
year-old boy near a local little league field.  Mr. Doe snatched and 
undressed the boy but was caught before things went further.  He was 
later convicted and served a fourteen-year prison sentence.  Mr. Doe has 
been out of prison for a year. 
An eight-year-old boy walks home from school.  It is a beautiful day, 
so the boy decided to take the long way home.  As the boy walks, Mr. 
Doe approaches him, his car creeping down the street.  Mr. Doe tells the 
boy that his parents are looking for him and that he was expected home 
twenty minutes ago.  Mr. Doe then offers the boy a ride home, which the 
boy accepts.  Two hours later, the boy is dumped in a ditch.  He is 
covered in blood, semen, dirt, and sweat.  The boy has been raped.  
Could this terrible ordeal have been avoided? 
In Illinois, the answer is maybe.2  The Illinois Sexually Violent 
Persons Commitment Act (“SVPA”) permits the civil commitment of 
sexually violent persons (“SVPs”).3  This commitment, typically imposed 
after the completion of a prison sentence, is allowed if the individual has 
                                                 
1 This scenario, loosely based on the case of Earl Shriner that sparked the Washington 
sexual predator law, was created by the Notewriter to illustrate a context in which the 
Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act would likely be invoked. 
2 See generally 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99 (West 2008) (defining and regulating 
sexually dangerous persons). 
3 See id. (allowing for the civil commitment of SVPs).  When discussing the SVPA 
throughout this Note, the author will use two terms—“sexually violent person” and “SVP.”  
While they refer to the same thing, the term will be spelled out as sexually violent person 
when referring to the specific language used in the SVPA.  When referring to a sexually 
violent person in passing or when describing statutory procedures, the author will use 
SVP.  For the purposes of this Note, the SVPA and similar laws in other jurisdictions will 
collectively be referred to as “sexual predator legislation” or “sexual predator laws.”  Those 
eligible for commitment under such laws, unless designated otherwise or referring to 
specific statutory language, will be referred to as “sexually violent individuals.” 
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a mental disorder that makes him or her substantially probable to engage in 
sexual violence.4  The importance of the specific language used in the 
SVPA cannot be overstated.5  Potentially indefinite civil commitment 
depends on the specific terminology used.6  More importantly, the 
constitutionality of a sexual predator law turns on its specific statutory 
language because there are certain constitutionally required elements of 
civil commitment that must be present for a sexual predator law to 
survive.7  These elements are built into specific statutory terms and 
definitions.8  In the SVPA’s case, some of the most crucial statutory 
language used to define a “mental disorder” has been ignored.9  
Additionally, the SVPA’s commitment standard of “substantially 
probable” is unique to Illinois and different from what has been 
constitutionally approved.10 
The purpose of this Note is to offer a model interpretation of the 
SVPA’s “mental disorder” definition and to suggest a change in the 
SVPA’s “substantially probable” standard.11  These adjustments will 
both increase the SVPA’s applicability to sexually violent individuals 
and uphold the SVPA’s constitutionality.12  Part II of this Note discusses 
the history of the SVPA, including general background information that 
led to the SVPA’s passing, the SVPA’s key language and judicial 
interpretation, and other important terms and authorities.13  Part III 
                                                 
4 Id. at 207/5(f). 
5 See infra notes 6–8 (explaining how indefinite civil commitment turns on specific 
terminology and how sexual predator laws are only constitutional if certain requirements 
are contained in statutory language). 
6 See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/65(a)(2) (calling for a civilly committed 
individual’s discharge petition to be denied if the state can prove the individual is still an 
SVP as defined in the statute). 
7 See In re Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 798–99 (Ill. 2003) (stating that a sexual 
predator law satisfies substantive due process if it contains definitions that supply the 
constitutionally required elements of civil commitment). 
8 See id. (explaining that the constitutionally required elements are built into specific 
statutory language and definitions). 
9 See infra Part III.A.1 (explaining how the “emotional capacity” language in the SVPA’s 
mental disorder definition has been ignored). 
10 See infra notes 99–100 (discussing the various commitment standards that states use in 
their sexual predator laws). 
11 See infra Part IV (proposing that the “mental disorder” definition in the SVPA be 
interpreted differently and that the SVPA’s standard for commitment be lowered from 
“substantially probable” to “likely”). 
12 See infra Part IV (demonstrating that the suggested changes will maintain the SVPA’s 
constitutionality while simultaneously increasing its applicability). 
13 See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of sexual predator legislation and how 
modern sexual predator laws have emerged); infra Part II.B (looking at the key United 
States Supreme Court decisions that upheld the constitutionality of modern sexual 
predator laws); infra Part II.C.1 (defining the SVPA’s key terminology); infra Part II.C.2 
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analyzes the statutory language used in the SVPA, along with its current 
interpretation.14  Finally, Part IV proposes a model interpretation of the 
SVPA’s “mental disorder” definition, and suggests a change to the 
SVPA’s “substantially probable” standard.15 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A certain group of individuals will predictably commit future acts of 
sexual violence.16  If these sexually violent individuals are handled solely 
by the criminal justice system, many of them will serve their prison 
terms, re-enter society, and then prey on more innocent victims.17  
Reacting to this crack in the criminal justice system, a number of states 
have enacted laws allowing for the involuntary civil commitment and 
treatment of sexually violent persons.18  While states use varying terms 
                                                                                                             
(covering the SVPA’s approval in light of the United States Supreme Court opinions on 
sexual predator legislation); infra Part II.D.1 (summarizing the language used in other 
jurisdictions’ sexual predator laws); infra Part II.D.2 (looking at dictionary definitions of 
terms that are found in the SVPA, as well as key mental health authorities). 
14 See infra Part III.A.1 (looking at the key inquiry under the SVPA and explaining that 
this inquiry is covered by using only a portion of the current statutory language); infra Part 
III.A.2 (discussing why the mental health community’s language is not decisive in 
determining SVPA civil commitments); infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the current standard 
used in committing individuals pursuant to the SVPA); infra Part III.B.2 (explaining why 
the current standard cannot be broken down into precise mathematical terms). 
15 See infra Part IV.A (stating that the emotional capacity language in the SVPA’s 
definition of a “mental disorder” needs to be given meaning); infra Part IV.B (proposing 
that the Illinois legislature lower the SVPA’s commitment standard from “substantially 
probable” to “likely”). 
16 Norm Maleng, The Community Protection Act and the Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 
15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 821, 823 (1992); see 53 AM. JUR. 2D Mentally Impaired Persons 
§ 125 (2006) (noting that there are certain individuals who, because of a mental condition, 
commit or have a propensity to commit sex offenses); see also Debra T. Landis, Annotation, 
Standard of Proof Required Under Statute Providing for Commitment of Sexual Offenders or Sexual 
Psychopaths, 96 A.L.R.3d 840, § 2 (1979) (explaining that there are individuals with 
psychopathic disorders which cause them to commit sex offenses). 
17 Maleng, supra note 16, at 823. 
18 See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701–3717 (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 
§§ 6600–6609.3 (West 1998 & Supp. 2009); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3803–3811 (2001); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 394.910–.932 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99 (West 
2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229A.1–.16 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-
29a01–29a22 (2005 & Supp. 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, §§ 1–16 (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185 (West 2007 & Supp. 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§§ 632.480–.513 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-1201–1226 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 135-E:1–24 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24–.38 (West 2008); N.Y. 
MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01–.17 (McKinney Supp. 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01–24 
(2002); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10–170 (2002 & Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-900–
920 (2005 & Supp. 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010–.903 (West 2008 & Supp. 
2010); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01–.14 (West 2007 & Supp. 2008).  The New York sexual 
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to label these sexually violent individuals, Illinois labels them as 
“sexually violent persons” and commits them pursuant to the SVPA.19 
                                                                                                             
predator law, passed in 2007, helps explain why sexual predator legislation is needed by 
stating that 
some sex offenders have mental abnormalities that predispose them to 
engage in repeated sex offenses.  These offenders may require long-
term specialized treatment modalities to address their risk to reoffend.  
They should receive such treatment while they are incarcerated as a 
result of the criminal process, and should continue to receive treatment 
when that incarceration comes to an end.  In extreme cases, 
confinement of the most dangerous offenders will need to be extended 
by civil process in order to provide them such treatment and to protect 
the public from their recidivistic conduct. 
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(b).  While there are many states with sexual predator laws, 
there is also some federal legislation on the topic.  See 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006) (allowing for 
the civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals).  The Attorney General may 
certify that someone in federal prison is a sexually dangerous person; a hearing is then 
ordered.  Id. § 4248(a).  If the court finds the person is a sexually dangerous person, he is 
committed to the custody of the Attorney General, who releases the person to the custody 
of the person’s home state or state where the person was tried.  Id. § 4248(d).  If the State 
will not take control of the person, the Attorney General places the person in a facility.  Id.  
This law, enacted in 2006, recently passed constitutional scrutiny.  See United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010).  There is also a federal law authorizing the Attorney 
General to give grants to states that pass sexual predator laws.  See 42 U.S.C. § 16971 (2006).  
To go along with sexual predator laws there are other methods of dealing with sex 
offenders and those considered sexually violent, including registration laws, community 
notification laws, and residency restrictions.  Caleb Durling, Never Going Home:  Does It 
Make Us Safer?  Does It Make Sense?  Sex Offenders, Residency Restrictions, and Reforming Risk 
Management Law, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 317 (2006); Wayne A. Logan, Liberty 
Interests in the Preventive State:  Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community 
Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1169 (1999).  Chemical castration, the 
process of pharmacological treatment that deprives individuals of the ability to experience 
sexual desire and engage in sexual activity, is also used in some circumstances.  John F. 
Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming:  Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and 
the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 561 (2006).  This Note will not discuss 
these methods further because it focuses on the statutory language found in the Illinois 
sexual predator law, not the merits of other systems. 
19 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701–3717 
(“Sexually Violent Persons”); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–6609.3 (“Sexually Violent 
Predators”); D.C. CODE §§ 22-3803–3811 (“sexual psychopath[s]”); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 394.910–.932 (“Sexually Violent Predators”); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229A.1–.16 (“Sexually 
Violent Predators”); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01–29a22 (“Sexually Violent Predators”); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, §§ 1–16 (“Sexually Dangerous Persons”); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 253B.185 (“sexually dangerous persons or persons with a sexual psychopathic 
personality”); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.480–.513 (“Sexually Violent Predators”); NEB. REV. 
STAT. §§ 71-1201–1226 (“dangerous sex offenders”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-E:1–24 
(“Sexually Violent Predators”); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.24–.38 (“sexually violent 
predator[s]”); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01–.17 (“Sex Offenders Requiring Civil 
Commitment or Supervision”); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01–24 (“Sexually dangerous 
individual[s]”); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10–170 (“Sexually Violent Predator[s]”); VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 37.2-900–920 (“Sexually Violent Predators”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010–
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 4
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Part II discusses the history of sexual predator legislation, looking in 
depth at the SVPA and other key terminology used in modern sexual 
predator laws.20  Specifically, Part II.A discusses the history and 
development of sexual predator legislation up until the SVPA was 
passed.21  Part II.B discusses the United States Supreme Court’s views on 
the civil commitment of sexually violent individuals under sexual 
predator laws, which are similar to the SVPA.22  Next, Part II.C looks at 
the SVPA’s specific statutory language as well as the Illinois courts’ 
interpretation and approval of it.23  Lastly, Part II.D discusses statutory 
definitions of other states’ sexual predator laws, in addition to clinical 
definitions and common usage of key terminology that will be useful 
while examining the language of the SVPA.24 
                                                                                                             
.903 (“sexually violent predators”); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01–.14 (“Sexually Violent 
Persons”); see also 53 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 16, § 125 (“A number of states have enacted 
statutes relating to sexually dangerous persons, or persons with psychopathic personality 
disorders, which are designed to cope with sex offenders who, because of a psychopathic 
condition, commit or have a tendency to commit sex offenses.”); Landis, supra note 16, § 2 
(explaining that statutes relating to sex offenders are designed to deal with problematic 
individuals who have a tendency to commit sex offenses).  Pennsylvania also refers to 
certain individuals as “sexually violent predator[s].”  42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9792 (West 
2007).  However, the only involuntary commitment law that Pennsylvania has pertains 
exclusively to children who are sexual predators.  Id. § 6403; see also Heather R. Willis, Note, 
Creeping by Moonlight:  A Look at Civil Commitment Laws for Sexually Violent Predators Through 
the Lens of the Yellow Wallpaper, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 161, 172 n.100 (2008) (noting 
that Pennsylvania aims its sexual predator legislation exclusively at young offenders).  
Basically, sexually violent delinquent children can be involuntarily committed, but sexually 
violent predators are only subject to registration.  See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6402–
6403, 9795.1(b)(3).  While some of the definitions Pennsylvania uses are comparable to 
other states’ sexual predator legislation, the Pennsylvania statute allowing civil 
commitment will not be discussed further in this Note because it is has a substantially 
different nature than other sexual predator legislation, that is, because it focuses only on 
minors.  Texas also has a law referring to “sexually violent predator[s].”  TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.150 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008).  However, because it only 
calls for outpatient treatment, not involuntary civil commitment, it will not be analyzed 
further in this Note.  See id. § 841.081(a) (calling for outpatient treatment and supervision 
for those found to be sexually violent predators).  There is also a federal law using the term 
“sexually violent predator,” but it is only a registration law unrelated to civil commitment.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(1) (2006) (calling for the Attorney General to establish guidelines 
for state sex offender registration programs). 
20 See infra Part II (discussing the development of sexual predator legislation and key 
terminology that allows civil commitment under these laws). 
21 See infra Part II.A (describing the emergence of sexual predator legislation and its 
development throughout the twentieth century). 
22 See infra Part II.B (explaining the United States Supreme Court’s position on modern 
sexual predator legislation). 
23 See infra Part II.C (discussing the SVPA, its key terminology, and its acceptance by 
Illinois courts). 
24 See infra Part II.D (presenting definitions and interpretations of other key terminology 
related to sexual predator legislation). 
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A. The History of Sexual Predator Legislation 
Sexual predator legislation, in some form or another, dates back to 
the 1930s.25  The early versions of sexual predator laws, collectively 
referred to as sexual psychopath laws, provided for involuntary civil 
commitment of sexually violent individuals instead of incarceration.26  
By the 1960s, a majority of the states and the District of Columbia had 
sexual psychopath laws in some form.27  Most of these laws, however, 
were repealed by the 1980s.28  The increased focus on civil rights resulted 
in a backlash against sexual psychopath laws, as well as lingering 
questions about the effectiveness of treatment programs.29 
                                                 
25 See John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment:  The Permissible Civil Detention of 
Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1996) (explaining that the 1930s 
marked the decade when state legislatures first began introducing special procedures to 
deal with individuals deemed to be sexually violent or dangerous); Adam D. Hirtz, Note, 
Lock ‘Em Up and Throw Away the Key:  Supreme Court Upholds Kansas’ Sexually Violent 
Predator Act in Kansas v. Hendricks, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 545, 545 (1998) (noting that the 
mass media of the 1930s began publicizing particularly violent and brutal sexual attacks); 
Kelly A. McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators in Kansas:  
A Modern Law for Modern Times, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 887, 888 (1994) (discussing the fact that 
Michigan passed the first sexual predator law in 1937); Willis, supra note 19, at 171 
(explaining that some states have had sex offender civil commitment laws since the 1930s 
and 1940s). 
26 See Juliet M. Dupuy, Comment, The Evolution of Wisconsin’s Sexual Predator Law, 79 
MARQ. L. REV. 873, 873 (1996) (noting that under early sexual psychopath laws, 
commitments were preferred over imprisonment); McCaffrey, supra note 25, at 888 (stating 
that Michigan adopted the first sexual psychopath law committing eligible individuals in 
lieu of prison); Willis, supra note 19, at 171 (explaining that sexual psychopath laws viewed 
commitment as an alternative to prison); Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as 
States Hold Sex Offenders After Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 
4144441 (noting that sexual psychopath laws in the early twentieth century were aimed at 
individuals too sick for prison). 
27 See Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1297 (noting that more than half of the states and the 
District of Columbia had some form of sexual predator legislation in place by 1960); Willis, 
supra note 19, at 171 (stating that more than twenty-five states had sexual predator 
legislation by the 1960s). 
28 See Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1297 (explaining that by the end of the 1980s, more than 
half of the sexual predator laws which existed in the 1960s had been repealed or expired); 
Tamara Rice Lave, Only Yesterday:  The Rise and Fall of Twentieth Century Sexual Psychopath 
Laws, 69 LA. L. REV. 549, 549 (2008) (noting that sexual psychopath laws were the first batch 
of laws aimed at sexually violent individuals but by 1990 most of these laws had been 
overturned or fallen out of use); Davey & Goodnough, supra note 26 (stating that, by the 
1980s, most sexual predator legislation had been repealed or stopped being used); see also 
D.C. CODE §§ 22-3803–3811 (West 2001) (allowing for the commitment of “sexual 
psychopaths”). 
29 See Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1297 (“By the end of the 1980s, however, [the number of 
sexual predator laws] had been cut in half, principally due to concerns about civil rights 
and the apparent lack of success of sex offender treatment programs.”); Willis, supra note 
19, at 171 (explaining that disfavor began to develop for sexual predator laws during the 
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Shortly after this period of repeal, state legislatures reacted to certain 
highly publicized cases by crafting the new versions of sexual predator 
legislation that exist today.30  The state of Washington was the first to 
adopt a modern sexual predator law, and it did so in reaction to a 
particularly brutal case involving a sex offender.31  In May 1989, a seven-
year-old boy was riding his bike through a wooded nature trail when he 
was approached by Earl Shriner.32  Shriner had recently completed a ten-
year prison sentence for kidnapping and sexually assaulting two teenage 
girls.33  Around dusk, a couple of hours later, a local family found the 
boy naked and covered with mud and blood.34  The boy had been orally 
and anally raped, stabbed, strangled, and castrated.35  Initially after the 
attack, the boy was in shock, mumbling incoherently and unable to 
speak.36  Once he regained the ability to speak, the boy identified 
Shriner.37 
Modern sexual predator laws, unlike many of the older statutes, are 
aimed at sexually violent individuals who are nearing the end of their 
prison term.38  While modern sexual predator laws are most often 
                                                                                                             
1970s mainly due to the fact that individuals treated under them never seemed to be 
cured). 
30 See Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1298 (noting that the 1990s have witnessed a rebirth of 
sexual predator legislation); Lave, supra note 28, at 549 (explaining that modern sexual 
predator laws are the second wave of sexual predator legislation); Willis, supra note 19, at 
172 (stating that Washington was the first state to draft a modern sexual predator statute 
and that it coined the popular phrase “sexually violent predator”); Davey & Goodnough, 
supra note 26 (explaining that the state of Washington was the first to react, passing a 
modern sexual predator law in 1990). 
31 See infra notes 32–37 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Earl Shriner). 
32 David Boerner, Confronting Violence:  In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. 
REV. 525, 525−26 (1992). 
33 Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1298. 
34 Boerner, supra note 32, at 525. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  Shriner was charged with attempted first degree murder, first degree rape, and 
first degree assault.  Id.; see also Stacey Mulick, Ceremony to Remember 20th Anniversary of 
“Little Tacoma Boy,” THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma), May 20, 2009, 
http://www.thenewstribune.com/2009/05/20/747814/ceremony-to-remember-20th-
anniversary.html.  After being convicted, Shriner was sentenced to 131 years in prison.  Id.  
Sadly, the boy who was the victim of the crime died in a motorcycle accident in 2005.  Id. 
38 See Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1298 (stating that the new generation of sexual predator 
legislation focuses on those who have been tried, convicted, sentenced, and nearing the end 
of their jail term); Eric S. Janus & Brad Bolin, An End-Game for Sexually Violent Predator Laws:  
As-Applied Invalidation, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 25, 27 (2008) (explaining that sexual predator 
laws use civil commitment to confine sexually violent individuals after the completion of a 
prison term); Willis, supra note 19, at 172 (explaining that in Washington and most other 
states with sexual predator legislation, a sexually violent individual only becomes eligible 
for involuntary civil commitment upon the expiration of his or her prison sentence). 
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invoked after imprisonment that stemmed from a criminal conviction, a 
prior conviction is not necessarily required.39  The basic procedure for 
commitment under these statutes usually requires the state to petition 
the court for commitment as the suspected sexually violent individual 
nears the end of a prison term.40  Typically, the state must prove that the 
individual is sexually violent and thus eligible for commitment beyond a 
reasonable doubt.41  If the state meets its burden and all constitutional 
requirements are met, a court will commit the sexually violent individual 
to treatment.42  The commitment is potentially indefinite with periodic 
reviews to assess whether the individual is safe enough to be released.  If 
the individual is still dangerous, however, he or she remains confined.43 
Sexual predator laws have two major goals:  (1) to protect the public 
from sexually violent individuals until those individuals are 
rehabilitated and released, and (2) to subject sexually violent individuals 
to treatment so the individual might be rehabilitated and return to 
society.44  In pursuing these two goals, sexual predator legislation 
provides “a secondary pathway for social control.”45  The civil 
commitment called for in sexual predator laws allows the strict 
standards and procedures of the criminal justice system to be 
                                                 
39 See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f) (West 2008) (allowing for the involuntary 
civil commitment of those who have been convicted of a sexually violent offense, 
adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or found not guilty of a sexually 
violent offense by reason of insanity); see also Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1300 (noting that 
in certain circumstances, an individual may also be committed under some sexual predator 
laws when there has been no adjudication or a finding of non-responsibility by reason of 
mental disease or defect). 
40 Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1300; see infra note 66 (giving a thorough explanation of the 
SVPA’s procedures). 
41 Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1300; see also infra note 66 (explaining the SVPA’s 
procedural requirements). 
42 E.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/40 (stating that if the individual is found to be 
sexually violent, the court must order the person committed for control, care, and 
treatment); see infra Part II.B (discussing the constitutional requirement that modern sexual 
predator laws must satisfy); infra note 66 (discussing the SVPA’s procedures). 
43 See Willis, supra note 19, at 171 (explaining that commitment under sexual predator 
legislation is potentially indefinite); Davey & Goodnough, supra note 26 (stating that 
modern sexual predator laws allow for the potentially indefinite civil commitment of 
certain individuals; however, under most laws, courts periodically review the cases of 
those committed). 
44 See 53 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 16, § 125 (2006) (explaining that the purpose of sexual 
predator laws is to sequester sexually violent individuals from the public and to subject 
sexually violent individuals to treatment); Landis, supra note 16, § 2 (stating that the social 
objectives of sexual predator legislation are:  (1) protecting society by containing sexually 
violent individuals, and (2) treating sexually violent individuals so that they might recover 
from their condition). 
45 Janus & Bolin, supra note 38, at 27. 
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inapplicable.46  As modern sexual predator laws have become 
increasingly common, the Supreme Court has been forced to address the 
constitutionality of this new breed of legislation.47 
B. Establishing That Sexually Violent People Can Be Civilly Committed 
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Supreme Court established that states can 
civilly commit sexually violent individuals so long as certain procedures 
are followed.48  Hendricks involved a challenge to the Kansas Sexually 
Violent Predator Act.49  The State of Kansas appealed a Kansas Supreme 
                                                 
46 Id. at 27, 31–32. 
47 See infra Part II.B (discussing the case law that found involuntary commitment of 
sexually violent individuals constitutional). 
48 See 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997) (holding that the Kansas law allowing for the civil 
commitment of sexually violent predators did not violate due process, double jeopardy, or 
ex post facto principles).  The Hendricks decision actually built on preventive detention 
principles laid out in Salerno.  See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987) 
(explaining that due process is not offended when the government seeks to achieve the 
legitimate and compelling regulatory goal of preventing future crime by detaining those it 
sees as dangerous).  At issue in Salerno was the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984.  Id. at 741.  
The Act allowed a judge to refuse bail and detain individuals before trial if the judge found 
the individuals were dangerous to the community.  Id. at 742.  Respondents were arrested 
on RICO violations and, pursuant to the Act, detained while awaiting trial.  Id. at 743.  
Respondents brought a due process challenge to the Act, first arguing that substantive due 
process was violated because the pretrial detention was impermissible punishment before 
trial.  Id. at 746.  The Court looked to legislative intent and found the Act to be aimed at 
regulation, not punishment.  Id. at 747.  The Act did not violate substantive due process 
because it was aimed at the legitimate regulatory goal of preventing danger to the 
community.  Id.  In fact, the government interest in preventing future crime was both 
legitimate and compelling.  Id. at 749.  The Court next disposed of the procedural due 
process challenge, explaining that the Act provided numerous procedural safeguards built 
into the detention determination.  Id. at 751–52.  Lastly, the Court rejected the respondents’ 
argument that the Act violated the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  Id. at 
752.  The Court initially noted that the Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be 
made available, but only serves to make sure bail is not excessive when made available.  Id.  
The Court then explained that when the government’s only interest is in preventing flight 
by the defendant, bail must be tailored to an appropriate amount to ensure that goal and 
no more.  Id. at 754.  However, when Congress has been clear that detention is based on an 
interest other than preventing flight, as with the Act in question, the Eighth Amendment 
does not require release on bail.  Id. at 754–55. 
49 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350.  The Act established civil commitment procedures for those 
persons found to be sexually violent predators.  Id.  A sexually violent predator was 
defined in the Act as a person with “a mental abnormality or personality disorder which 
makes the person likely to engage in . . . sexual violence.”  Id. at 352.  Kansas defined a 
mental abnormality as a “congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or 
volitional capacity which predisposes the person” to sexual violence.  Id.  The Act required 
notification to the local prosecutor sixty days before the anticipated release of a person who 
might qualify for commitment under the Act.  Id.  Within forty-five days, the prosecutor 
was then required to decide whether or not to file a petition seeking involuntary 
commitment of the person.  Id.  If the petition was filed, the court had to decide whether 
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Court ruling, which held that the Act violated substantive due process 
rights.50  The United States Supreme Court held that substantive due 
process was satisfied by a finding of future dangerousness, which was 
then linked “to the existence of a ‘mental abnormality’ or ‘personality 
disorder’ that [made] it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to 
control his dangerous behavior.”51  Requiring a mental abnormality or 
                                                                                                             
there was probable cause to believe the person was a sexually violent predator.  Id.  If 
probable cause was found, the person was transferred for a mental evaluation.  Id.  
Eventually a trial was held where the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the person was a sexually violent predator.  Id. at 352–53.  If this burden was 
satisfied, the person was taken into custody by the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation 
Services for control, care, and treatment.  Id. at 353.  The Act also had a number of 
procedural safeguards, such as the assistance of counsel for indigent persons, examinations 
by mental health professionals, the right to be present and cross-examine witnesses, the 
opportunity to review evidence presented by the State, annual reviews to determine 
whether continued detention was warranted, the possibility at any time for release if the 
person’s condition had changed and the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services 
believed release was appropriate, and the opportunity to petition the court at any time to 
challenge whether the State could still satisfy its burden of proof.  Id. 
50 Id. at 356.  In Hendricks, Hendricks was convicted of molesting two teenage boys.  Id. at 
353.  Hendricks served nearly ten years in prison and was approaching release at the time 
Kansas petitioned the court seeking Hendricks’s civil commitment pursuant to the Sexually 
Violent Predator Act.  Id. at 353–54.  At a jury trial to determine if Hendricks was a sexually 
violent predator, Hendricks’s own testimony revealed that he had engaged in numerous 
acts of child molestation dating back to 1955.  Id. at 354.  Hendricks’s acts of child 
molestation included the abuse of his own stepdaughter and stepson.  Id.  Furthermore, 
Hendricks admitted that he repeatedly sexually abused children when not confined, and 
that he molested children when he got stressed out.  Id. at 355.  A jury unanimously found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks was a sexually violent predator.  Id.  Pursuant to 
the Act, Hendricks was then civilly committed.  Id. at 355–56.  Hendricks appealed, and the 
Kansas Supreme Court accepted his due process challenge.  Id. at 356.  The court explained 
that in involuntary civil commitment proceedings, substantive due process requires the 
state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and a 
danger to himself or others.  Id.  The court then struck down the Act’s definition of “mental 
abnormality” and found the Act to be a violation of substantive due process.  Id.  The court 
did not address double jeopardy or ex post facto issues.  Id. 
51 Id. at 358.  The Act at issue in Hendricks required a finding of dangerousness to one’s 
self or others as a prerequisite to involuntary confinement.  Id. at 357.  Commitment was 
only allowed under the Act after a person had been convicted of or charged with a sexually 
violent offense, and that person had a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” 
which made the person likely to engage in predatory sexual violence.  Id.  “The statute thus 
requires proof of more than a mere predisposition to violence; rather, it requires evidence 
of past sexually violent behavior and a present mental condition that creates a likelihood of 
such conduct in the future if the person is not incapacitated.”  Id. at 357−58.  The Court 
noted that a finding of dangerousness, standing alone, was not sufficient to justify 
indefinite involuntary commitment.  Id. at 358.  Hendricks further argued that “mental 
abnormality” was not equivalent to “mental illness” because the Kansas legislature, not 
psychiatrists, created the term.  Id. at 358–59.  The Court rejected this argument because 
psychiatrists themselves disagree over specific terminology and state legislatures have 
never been required to adopt “particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/4
2011] Redefining Sexually Violent Person in Illinois 561 
personality disorder before an individual can be committed caused the 
number of persons who were eligible for commitment to decrease 
compared to those who lack volitional control, that is, those who are 
unable to control their behavior.52  Furthermore, because civil 
commitment statutes aimed at sexually violent individuals are civil laws 
rather than criminal laws, double jeopardy and ex post facto challenges 
also failed.53 
Just five years after Hendricks, the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator 
Act was again at issue in Kansas v. Crane.54  The Crane Court did not 
overrule Hendricks, but instead sought to clarify its holding and elaborate 
on the lack-of-volitional-control requirement when civilly committing 
sexually violent individuals.55  The Crane Court held that while a 
                                                                                                             
statutes.”  Id. at 359; see Carolyn B. Ramsey, California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act:  The 
Role of Psychiatrists, Courts, and Medical Determinations in Confining Sex Offenders, 26 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 469, 476 (1998) (explaining that the Court’s disregard of any 
distinction between a “mental abnormality” and a “mental illness” revealed a distrust of 
medical science’s terminology in the law). 
52 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358–60. 
53 Id. at 361–71.  As an initial matter, the Court looked to statutory construction; the 
legislature’s placement of the Act in the probate code, not the criminal code, suggested that 
the legislature viewed this as a civil law.  Id. at 361.  Additionally, the legislature described 
the Act as creating civil commitment procedures.  Id.  The Court further reasoned that the 
Act was civil in nature because it did not implicate either of the primary objectives of 
criminal punishment:  retribution or deterrence.  Id. at 361–62.  The Act at issue in Hendricks 
did not make criminal conviction a prerequisite for civil commitment; persons absolved of 
criminal responsibility could qualify for commitment under the Act.  Id. at 362.  Since 
criminal responsibility was not required, the State was not seeking retribution for past 
misconduct.  Id.  Furthermore, no finding of scienter was required to qualify for 
commitment under the Act.  Id.  Deterrence was also not an objective because persons who 
qualify for commitment under the Act cannot exercise control over their behavior; thus, the 
threat of confinement is unlikely to deter them.  Id. at 362–63.  Since the Act was civil in 
nature, the Double Jeopardy Clause, which prohibits being punished twice for the same 
offense, was not offended.  Id. at 369.  “The Ex Post Facto Clause, which ‘forbids the 
application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated,’” was also not 
offended because it pertains exclusively to penal statutes.  Id. at 370 (quoting Cal. Dep’t of 
Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 505 (1995)).  Furthermore, the Act makes an evaluation based 
on current mental condition, not past conduct.  Id. at 371.  Past conduct is only used for 
evidentiary purposes.  Id.  The dissenting opinion pointed out that the Act did not put an 
emphasis on treatment.  Id. at 396 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Without an emphasis on 
treatment, the Act could not be considered civil; thus, the Act, through involuntary 
commitment, amounted to punishment.  Id.; see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) 
(explaining that a state’s punitive interest allows it to imprison criminals for the purposes 
of deterrence and retribution); see also Janus & Bolin, supra note 38, at 25 (explaining that in 
order to be constitutional, sexual predator laws must be regulatory or non-punitive). 
54 See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002) (reconsidering the statute initially 
addressed in Hendricks). 
55 Id. at 411–12; see also People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 746 (Ill. 2003) (noting that 
nothing in the Crane majority alters or overrules the principles announced in Hendricks).  
The Kansas Supreme Court narrowly interpreted Hendricks as requiring the State to always 
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complete or total lack-of-volitional-control finding is not necessary for 
civil commitment, some lack-of-volitional-control determination must be 
made.56  The Court reasoned that an absolutist approach that requires a 
complete lack-of-volitional-control determination is unworkable.57 
It is worth noting that the Kansas Supreme Court made a distinction 
between “emotional capacity” and “volitional capacity” when 
                                                                                                             
prove a complete inability to control behavior as a prerequisite to civilly commit a sexually 
violent predator.  Crane, 534 U.S. at 411.  The State challenged this interpretation as being 
too rigid.  Id. 
56 Crane, 534 U.S. at 411–13.  The Court averred that most severely ill people, even those 
considered psychopaths, have some ability to control their behavior.  Id. at 412.  Requiring 
an absolute lack-of-volitional-control finding, therefore, “would risk barring the civil 
commitment of highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities.”  Id.  
However, the Constitution does not permit commitment without any lack-of-volitional-
control determination.  Id.  “[T]here must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling 
behavior.  And this . . . must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender 
whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment 
from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”  Id. at 
413.  The Court recognized that this interpretation of Hendricks does not give a precise 
constitutional standard in regards to civil commitment; however, the Court concluded by 
noting that the Constitution’s human liberty protections in regards to mental illness and 
the law are not best enforced through bright-line rules.  Id.; see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 
U.S. 68, 81 (1985) (explaining that psychiatry is not an exact science and psychiatrists 
oftentimes disagree on what constitutes mental illness). 
57 Crane, 534 U.S. at 411.  The additional requirement that the Court formulated, the lack-
of-volitional-control determination, was strongly criticized by the dissent.  Id. at 422–23 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia voiced his disapproval by stating the following: 
I not only disagree with the Court's gutting of our holding in 
Hendricks; I also doubt the desirability, and indeed even the coherence, 
of the new constitutional test which (on the basis of no analysis except 
a misreading of Hendricks) it substitutes.  Under our holding in 
Hendricks, a jury in an SVPA commitment case would be required to 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, (1) that the person previously 
convicted of one of the enumerated sexual offenses is suffering from a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder, and (2) that this condition 
renders him likely to commit future acts of sexual violence.  Both of 
these findings are coherent, and (with the assistance of expert 
testimony) well within the capacity of a normal jury.  Today's opinion 
says that the Constitution requires the addition of a third finding:  (3) 
that the subject suffers from an inability to control behavior—not utter 
inability, and not even inability in a particular constant degree, but 
rather inability in a degree that will vary “in light of such features of 
the case as the nature of the psychiatric diagnosis, and the severity of 
the mental abnormality itself.” 
This formulation of the new requirement certainly displays an 
elegant subtlety of mind.  Unfortunately, it gives trial courts, in future 
cases under the many commitment statutes similar to Kansas's SVPA, 
not a clue as to how they are supposed to charge the jury! 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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interpreting a mental abnormality and had its analysis struck down.58  
The Crane Court, however, did not hold that “emotional capacity” and 
“volitional capacity” are the same for the purposes of civil 
commitment.59  On the contrary, the Court did not even consider the 
“emotional capacity” language because the “volitional capacity” inquiry 
was enough to uphold the Act.60  In fact, neither the Hendricks nor Crane 
Courts considered what exactly the “emotional capacity” language, so 
often found in sexual predator legislation, means.61  Having looked at the 
key decisions establishing sexual predator laws as constitutional, the 
SVPA and its specific language can now be discussed.62 
C. The Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act 
States use varying terminology to label the class of individuals 
regulated by their sexual predator laws.63  Illinois refers to these 
                                                 
58 See id. at 415 (majority opinion) (vacating the Kansas Supreme Court’s judgment 
which interpreted the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); infra note 86 (explaining that 
the Kansas Supreme Court believed “emotional” and “volitional” actually referred to 
separate capacities). 
59 See Crane, 534 U.S. at 411–13 (holding that while a complete or total lack-of-volitional-
control finding is not necessary for civil commitment, some lack-of-volitional-control 
determination must be made). 
60 See id. at 413 (explaining that, in order to civilly commit someone under the Kansas 
Sexually Violent Predator Act, there must be proof that the individual has serious difficulty 
in controlling his or her behavior).  However, the Court further explained that its decision 
did not address whether civil commitment based solely on a mental abnormality involving 
the “emotional capacity” would be constitutional.  Id. at 415. 
61 See id. (noting that the “emotional capacity” language was not considered in Hendricks, 
nor is it considered in the present case).  The Crane Court further explained that 
[r]egardless, Hendricks must be read in context.  The Court did not 
draw a clear distinction between the purely “emotional” sexually 
related mental abnormality and the “volitional.”  Here, as in other 
areas of psychiatry, there may be “considerable overlap between 
a . . . defective understanding or appreciation and . . . [an] ability to 
control . . . behavior.”  Nor, when considering civil commitment, have 
we ordinarily distinguished for constitutional purposes among 
volitional, emotional, and cognitive impairments.  The Court in 
Hendricks had no occasion to consider whether confinement based 
solely on “emotional” abnormality would be constitutional, and we 
likewise have no occasion to do so in the present case. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
62 See infra Part II.C (discussing the enactment, key terminology, and judicial approval of 
the SVPA). 
63 See supra note 19 (elaborating on the varying terminology states use to describe a sex 
offender subject to civil commitment; this terminology includes phrases such as:  sexual 
psychopath, sexually violent person, sexually violent predator, sexually dangerous person, 
person with a sexual psychopathic personality, dangerous sex offender, sex offender 
requiring civil commitment or supervision, and sexually dangerous individual). 
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individuals as sexually violent persons, and they are regulated by the 
SVPA.64  The SVPA became effective on January 1, 1998.65  The SVPA 
permits the commitment of sexually violent individuals provided that 
the state follows certain procedures.66  The SVPA can best be understood 
                                                 
64 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99 (West 2008).  Closely related to the SVPA is 
another Illinois law entitled the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (“SDPA”).  Id. at 
205/1.01–12.  The SDPA can be applied to individuals who have never faced a trial for a 
sex offense.  People v. Winterhalter, 730 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).  The SDPA 
can be applied to individuals so long as the state can convince the trier of fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the person has criminal propensities to the commission of sex 
offenses.  People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 743 (Ill. 2003).  The SVPA, however, only 
applies to individuals who have “been convicted, adjudicated delinquent, or found not 
guilty by reason of insanity, of a sexually violent offense.”  Winterhalter, 730 N.E.2d at 1162.  
Also “[u]nlike the SVPA, the SDPA does not specifically address the probability or 
likelihood that the subject of the proceeding will engage in sexual offenses in the future.”  
Masterson, 798 N.E.2d at 743; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f) (using a 
“substantially probable” standard).  This Note will focus on the SVPA for two major 
reasons:  (1) the SVPA is most similar to sex offender civil commitment laws in other 
jurisdictions, thus allowing for better comparisons, and (2) this Note is a critique of existing 
statutory language, not language that is yet to be written or which has been purposefully 
omitted.  The SVPA also relieves some of the strain already felt on underfunded Illinois 
prisons.  See, e.g., Monique Garcia, Quinn to Release 1,000 Inmates from Prison in Cost-Cutting 
Move, CHI. TRIB., (Sept. 18, 2009, 5:38 PM), http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/ 
2009/09/quinn-to-release-1000-inmates-from-prison-in-costcuttingmove.html?utm_source 
=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+chicagotribune%2Fcloutstre
et+(Chicago+Tribune%3A+Clout+Street) (discussing a recent attempt at saving money in 
Illinois by releasing prisoners early and laying off prison workers); Josh Stockinger, Future 
Uncertain for Aging St. Charles Youth Prison, DAILY HERALD (Chi.), Nov. 29, 2009, 
http://www.dailyherald.com/story/?id=340307 (discussing the funding issues in Illinois 
prisons). 
65 Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, Pub. Act 90-40 (1997) (codified as 
amended at 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99 (West 2008)). 
66 See generally 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99 (stating all of the procedures and 
requirements necessary for commitment as an SVP).  Under the SVPA, the State’s Attorney 
in the appropriate county is given written notification of the suspected SVP’s release date 
from incarceration.  Id. at 207/9.  Notification is to be given at least six months prior to the 
anticipated release date by the Illinois Department of Corrections or the Department of 
Juvenile Justice; the notification explains that the person will be considered for 
commitment under the SVPA.  Id.  Three months prior to the person’s release or discharge, 
if the person is found to be subject to commitment, the appropriate agency shall inform the 
State’s Attorney and the Attorney General of the person’s name, offense history, mental 
condition, treatment, and numerous other pieces of information.  Id. at 207/10(b)–(c).  
Based on the report, the Attorney General, at the request of the agency with jurisdiction, 
the applicable State’s Attorney, or both working jointly, may then file a petition with the 
circuit court alleging that the person is an SVP.  Id. at 207/15(a)(1)–(3).  The petition has to 
be filed not more than ninety days before the person’s anticipated release.  Id. at 207/15(b-
6).  The proceedings under the SVPA are civil in nature.  Id. at 207/20.  Upon filing of the 
petition, the court reviews the petition to determine if there is probable cause that the 
person is an SVP.  Id. at 207/30(a).  If probable cause is found, the person is taken into 
custody and transferred to an appropriate facility for an evaluation.  Id. at 207/30(c).  If 
probable cause is not found, the petition is dismissed.  Id.  No later than 120 days after the 
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by looking at its key terminology and the approval of this terminology in 
light of Hendricks and Crane.67 
1. The SVPA’s Key Terminology and Definitions 
The SVPA defines a sexually violent person as a person who suffers 
from a mental disorder that makes the person substantially probable to 
engage in sexual violence.68  Thus, the meaning of the term “sexually 
                                                                                                             
probable cause hearing is held, a trial is conducted to determine if the person is an SVP.  Id. 
at 207/35(a).  Upon request, the trial may be by a jury; otherwise, it is a bench trial.  Id. at 
207/35(c).  The petitioner, that is, the state, has the burden of proving the allegations in the 
petition beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 207/35(d)(1).  If the court or jury determines 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the person is an SVP, the person shall be committed.  Id. at 
207/35(f).  If the court or jury is not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, the petition is 
dismissed and the person is released.  Id.  The terms of the commitment are decided by the 
court, and these terms can be for either institutional care at a secure facility or conditional 
release.  Id. at 207/40(b)(1)–(2).  If institutional care at a secure facility is ordered, the 
Department of Human Services places the SVP at a facility provided by the Department of 
Corrections.  Id. at 207/50(a).  The Department of Human Services must submit a written 
report to the court within six months of the initial commitment, and at least once every 
twelve months thereafter. Id. at 207/55(a).  The report is on the SVP’s mental condition and 
whether the SVP has made enough progress to be conditionally released or discharged.  Id.  
An SVP who has been institutionalized for care at a secure facility may petition the court 
for conditional release.  Id. at 207/60(a).  The petition can be filed if at least six months have 
passed since the initial commitment, the denial of the most recent release petition, or the 
revocation of the most recent order for conditional release.  Id.  The director of the facility 
where the SVP is being treated may petition for conditional release at any time.  Id.  An SVP 
may also petition the court for a complete discharge.  Id. at 207/65(b)(1).  Furthermore, if 
the Secretary of Human Services determines at any time that the SVP is no longer sexually 
violent, the Secretary of Human Services shall authorize a petition for discharge.  Id. at 
207/65(a)(1).  The State’s Attorney or Attorney General, whoever filed the original petition, 
shall represent the state in challenging the SVP’s petition for conditional release or 
discharge.  Id. at 207/60(b), 207/65(a)(2).  In response to petitions for conditional release or 
discharge, the state has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the 
SVP is still sexually violent.  Id. at 207/60(d), 207/65(a)(2).  If the state fails to meet its 
burden of proof, the person shall be released.  Id. at 207/65(a)(3).  See generally In re Det. of 
Lieberman, 929 N.E.2d 616, 618–31 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (discussing the procedures of the 
SVPA and the discretion of the trial court in SVP determinations).  There is currently a 
proposed amendment that would give authority to the Department of Healthcare and 
Family Services, rather than the Department of Human Services.  See H.R. 5303, 2009 Leg., 
96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010). 
67 See infra Part II.C.1 (looking at the SVPA’s statutory language); infra Part II.C.2 
(discussing the SVPA’s treatment, as well as approval, by the Illinois Supreme Court). 
68 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f).  The precise definition offered in the SVPA is that 
a sexually violent person is 
a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has 
been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been 
found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and 
who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder 
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violent person” depends on the meanings of “mental disorder” and 
“substantially probable.”69  The term “mental disorder” is defined as a 
condition affecting the “emotional or volitional capacity” that 
predisposes an individual to sexual violence.70  The Illinois Supreme 
Court has refused to rely solely on medical science when interpreting the 
definition of mental disorder.71 
The SVPA does not provide a definition of “substantially 
probable.”72  As a result, Illinois courts have been forced to interpret 
what this means.73  Through such analysis, courts defined “substantially 
probable” as meaning “much more likely than not.”74  While crafting a 
definition of “substantially probable,” Illinois courts have made it clear 
that the definition cannot be broken down into a mathematical 
                                                                                                             
that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts 
of sexual violence. 
Id.  When originally passed, the definition provided that a sexually violent person could 
have “been found not guilty of or not responsible for a sexually violent offense by reason of 
insanity, mental disease or mental defect.”  Pub. Act 90-40 (1997).  The current definition, 
however, was drafted eight months after the SVPA went into effect.  Pub. Act 90-793 (1998). 
69 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f). 
70 Id. at 207/5(b).  The SVPA fully defines a mental disorder as “a congenital or acquired 
condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage 
in acts of sexual violence.”  Id. 
71 See infra Part III.A.2 (explaining why the mental health community’s definition of a 
mental disorder is not the determining factor in SVPA civil commitments). 
72 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5 (omitting a definition of “substantially 
probable”). 
73 See In re Det. of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 452–54 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (discussing what 
“substantially probable” means and how it compares to the standard upheld in Hendricks); 
In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1155–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (assessing what 
“substantially probable” means in light of its interpretation by courts in other states); In re 
Det. of Walker, 731 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (discussing what “substantially 
probable” means and whether it can be broken down into a mathematical formula). 
74 See Hayes, 747 N.E.2d at 453 (defining “substantially probable” as meaning “much 
more likely than not”); Bailey, 740 N.E.2d at 1156–57 (explaining that “substantially 
probable” means “much more likely than not,” a definition already formulated and 
accepted in Wisconsin).  In Bailey, the court relied on a Wisconsin case, In re Commitment of 
Curiel, 597 N.W.2d 697 (Wis. 2000), in defining the term “substantially probable.”  Bailey, 
740 N.E.2d at 1156.  The Curiel court equated the term “substantial probability” to 
substantially probable, finding no difference between the two terms.  Id.  “Substantially” 
means considerable in importance, value, degree, amount, or extent; furthermore, the term 
“much” can commonly convey the same meaning as “substantially.”  Id.  “Probable” can be 
defined as having “more evidence for than against.”  Id.  Since dictionary meanings can be 
looked to in the absence of a statutory definition, the Bailey court concluded that 
“substantially probable” is defined as “much more likely than not.”  Id. at 1157. 
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standard.75  The specific language and definitions discussed above 
provide the framework for the SVPA’s constitutional analysis.76 
2. The SVPA’s Approval After Hendricks and Crane 
In 2001, the SVPA was challenged in light of Hendricks.77  The Illinois 
Supreme Court upheld the SVPA, reasoning that the SVPA, much like 
the Kansas law found constitutional in Hendricks, requires a finding of a 
mental disorder that affects an individual’s ability to control his or her 
behavior.78  The major focus in the SVPA is whether an individual can 
control his or her sexually violent acts.79  The two terms used in defining 
a mental disorder, “emotional” and “volitional,” are adjectives ensuring 
that those meant to be covered by the statute are included under its 
language.80  After meeting constitutional scrutiny initially, the SVPA was 
again challenged after the Crane decision.81  The Illinois Supreme Court, 
                                                 
75 See Hayes, 747 N.E.2d at 453 (stating that “substantially probable” cannot be broken 
down into percentages); Walker, 731 N.E.2d at 1002 (rejecting the idea that “substantially 
probable” can be reduced to a percentage). 
76 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the SVPA’s approval in light of Hendricks and Crane). 
77 In re Det. of Varner, 759 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ill. 2001).  Varner involved a substantive due 
process challenge to the SVPA based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hendricks.  Id.  The 
petitioner’s argument was that his commitment under the SVPA could not be reconciled 
“with the principles of substantive due process because it occurred without a specific 
finding by the jury that he lacked volitional control over his sexually violent criminal 
behavior.”  Id.  The petitioner further claimed that his commitment was only constitutional 
if he lacked volitional control over his sexually violent conduct.  Id. 
78 Id. at 564.  The jury’s determination that petitioner was an SVP necessarily required a 
finding that he suffered from a mental disorder.  Id.  The pre-commitment finding of a 
mental disorder, appropriately defined in the SVPA, was sufficient to “narrow[] the class of 
persons eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness.”  
Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997)). 
79 Id. at 565. 
80 Id.  The Varner court further explained that 
the terms “emotional” and “volitional” are merely adjectives used to 
describe the reasons an individual might lack the capacity to control 
his behavior.  Medical science’s understanding of mental pathology is 
imperfect and evolving, and the legislature used these terms simply to 
insure that everyone who is unable to control his or her sexually 
violent behavior is covered by the law, whatever the precise reason for 
that lack of control might be. 
Id. 
81 In re Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 796–97 (Ill. 2003).  The case involved the same 
petitioner and the same substantive due process challenge as the earlier Varner decision, 
759 N.E.2d 560 (Ill. 2001).  Id. at 795.  However, the United States Supreme Court vacated 
the earlier decision and remanded the case to the Illinois Supreme Court for further 
consideration in light of Crane.  Id. 
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relying heavily on its previous opinion, once again upheld the SVPA.82  
The court rejected the petitioner’s claim that Crane required a specific 
lack-of-volitional-control determination.83  So long as the SVPA contains 
specific definitions that encompass the constitutional elements of civil 
commitment, substantive due process is satisfied.84 
The Illinois Supreme Court decisions after Hendricks and Crane 
elaborated on the “mental disorder” language and rejected the position 
that “emotional” and “volitional” refer to separate capacities.85  The 
Kansas Supreme Court, in its interpretation of a “mental abnormality,” 
believed that the two words “emotional” and “volitional” actually 
referred to separate capacities.86  In assessing the “emotional or volitional 
                                                 
82 Id. at 799; see also In re Det. of Isbell, 777 N.E.2d 994, 998–99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (giving 
a thorough discussion of the SVPA’s Varner approval in light of Crane). 
83 Varner, 800 N.E.2d at 798.  The Court reasoned that, because the Crane Court upheld 
the commitment in Hendricks, Crane does not require a specific determination by the fact 
finder in every case that a person cannot control his or her behavior.  Id.  The Court went 
on to further state the following: 
As we recently observed in Masterson:  “Clearly the justices of the 
Crane majority did not believe their decision called into question the 
continued viability of Hendricks.  Nothing said in the majority opinion 
explicitly repudiates or alters principles espoused in Hendricks.”  We 
acknowledge that Masterson involved the constitutionality of a 
commitment under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act.  
Nevertheless, our decision included a thorough analysis of the Act at 
issue in this case, i.e., the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment 
Act . . . .  For this reason, our analysis of the Act in Masterson provides 
substantial guidance in this case. 
In Masterson, we noted that several state courts have held that 
their sexually violent offender statutes conformed to Hendricks and 
Crane where those statutes, like our Act, require proof of the 
commission of a prior offense, and include specific definitions of 
“mental abnormality” or “mental disorder,” as well as a defined 
burden regarding the likelihood of future offenses.  Those statutes, as 
with our Act, contain definitions that supply the constitutionally 
required elements for civil commitment.  A fact finder properly 
instructed with definitions of these and other pertinent statutory terms 
need not receive additional separate instruction on lack of control. 
Id. at 798–99 (citations omitted); see also People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 748 (Ill. 2003) 
(looking to the SVPA to shape the ,ourt’s analysis of the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act 
because the two statutes are “governed by one spirit and a single policy”). 
84 See Varner, 800 N.E.2d at 798–99 (explaining that substantive due process is satisfied 
with carefully crafted definitions). 
85 See infra notes 86–88 (discussing the Kansas Supreme Court’s view that “emotional” 
and “volitional” refer to separate capacities and why Illinois has rejected this). 
86 Varner, 800 N.E.2d at 797.  The Kansas Supreme Court’s interpretation of “emotional 
or volitional capacity” was twofold:  (1) by including the term “volitional,” the legislature 
was addressing a condition which prevented an individual from controlling his or her 
behavior; and (2) by including “emotional,” the Court believed the legislature must have 
intended to include an additional circumstance unrelated to an inability to control one’s 
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capacity” language, however, Illinois has rejected this distinction and 
emphasized that the most important element is whether the person is 
able to control his or her behavior.87  The Illinois Supreme Court has 
taken the position that the Illinois legislature, in drafting the SVPA, 
simply wanted to make its language as inclusive as possible.88  While the 
above-mentioned Illinois Supreme Court decisions provide substantial 
guidance on the SVPA’s interpretation, it is also useful to look at and 
compare the language offered in similar sexual predator laws and other 
authorities.89 
D. Language and Key Definitions in Other Jurisdictions 
Illinois is not the only state that has a sexual predator law.90  Indeed, 
the SVPA is shaped by the same overarching principles that guide all 
sexual predator legislation.91  To fully understand the SVPA’s language, 
it is helpful to look at definitions offered in similar laws as well as other 
authorities.92  The definitions offered by other states’ sexual predator 
laws are discussed below, followed by the language of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) and common 
dictionary definitions.93 
                                                                                                             
behavior.  Id.  Through this interpretation, the Kansas court did not believe the statute met 
the Hendricks standard of only applying to persons who cannot control their dangerous 
behavior.  Id. 
87 See id. (reasoning that the Illinois legislature did not use the terms “emotional” and 
“volitional” as a way to differentiate between individuals who can control their sexually 
violent behavior and those who cannot).  The terms “emotional” and “volitional” merely 
describe the reasons someone might be unable to control his or her behavior.  Id. 
88 See id. (rejecting the Kansas interpretation of “emotional or volitional capacity” and 
reasoning that the Illinois legislature simply wanted to ensure that everyone who is unable 
to control his or her sexually violent behavior is covered by the SVPA); supra note 87 
(discussing the Illinois Supreme Court’s explanation of why “emotional” and “volitional” 
do not refer to separate capacities). 
89 See infra Part II.D (discussing the language of other jurisdictions’ sexual predator laws 
and other definitions of key terminology). 
90 See supra note 18 (listing the states that have sexual predator laws). 
91 See supra notes 38–46 and accompanying text (discussing the guiding principles and 
goals of sexual predator legislation). 
92 E.g., In re Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 796–99 (Ill. 2003) (comparing the SVPA to the 
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act); see also In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1155–57 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (looking to a Wisconsin law and dictionary definitions in order to 
interpret what “substantially probable” meant). 
93 See infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the statutory language that states other than Illinois 
use in their sexual predator laws); infra Part II.D.2 (looking at numerous other definitions 
found in medical diagnostic manuals and dictionaries). 
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1. The Language Found in Other Sexual Predator Laws 
The SVPA uses the terms “mental disorder” and “substantially 
probable” to compose its sexually violent person definition.94  Thus, 
someone is an SVP if he or she has a mental disorder that makes him or 
her substantially probable to engage in sexual violence.95  The structure 
of the SVPA’s sexually violent person definition mirrors other states’ 
definitions; however, there are variations among the terms used.96  In 
regard to the SVPA’s mental disorder language, a few states, like Illinois, 
use the term “mental disorder.”97  Most states, however, use a 
combination of “mental abnormality” and “personality disorder.”98  In 
regard to the SVPA’s “substantially probable” language, most states 
                                                 
94 See supra note 68 (explaining how Illinois defines an SVP). 
95 See supra note 68 (illustrating that the two terms mental disorder and substantially 
probable define an SVP under the SVPA). 
96 See infra notes 97–100 (discussing the definitions that other states use in their sexual 
predator laws and comparing the most common terminology found in those definitions). 
97 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7)(b) (2009) (using the term “mental disorder” in 
defining a sexually violent person); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (West 1998 & 
Supp. 2009) (using the term “mental disorder” in defining a sexually violent predator); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7) (West Supp. 2008) (using the term “mental disorder” to define a 
sexually violent person). 
98 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10)(b) (West 2006 & Supp. 2009) (using the phrase 
“mental abnormality or personality disorder” to define a sexually violent predator); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 229A.2(11) (West Supp. 2009) (using the term “mental abnormality” to define 
a sexually violent predator); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2008) (defining a 
sexually violent predator as someone with a “mental abnormality or personality disorder”); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, § 1 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009) (using the terms “mental 
abnormality” and “personality disorder” in the definition of a sexually dangerous person); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (West 2006) (using the term “mental abnormality” to define a 
sexually violent predator); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01(1) (2008) (referring to dangerous sex 
offenders as individuals with a “mental illness” or “personality disorder”); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 135-E:2(XII)(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008) (using the phrase “mental abnormality or 
personality disorder” to define a sexually violent predator); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 
(West 2008) (defining a sexually violent predator as someone with a “mental abnormality 
or personality disorder”); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(e) (McKinney Supp. 2009) 
(stating that a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement is someone who suffers from 
a “mental abnormality”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(1)(b) (2002 & Supp. 2008) (using the 
phrase “mental abnormality or personality disorder” to define a sexually violent predator); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (2005 & Supp. 2009) (requiring a “mental abnormality” or 
“personality disorder” to be considered a sexually violent predator); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 71.09.020(18) (West 2008 & Supp. 2010) (defining a sexually violent predator as 
someone with a “mental abnormality or personality disorder”); see also N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 25-03.3-01(8) (2002) (stating that a sexually dangerous individual is someone with a 
“personality disorder, or other mental disorder or dysfunction”). 
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choose to apply the “likely” standard.99  However, Missouri is unique 
because it uses a “more likely than not” standard.100 
In many circumstances, the sexual predator laws in other 
jurisdictions also provide definitions of key terminology.101  For instance, 
many sexual predator laws define a “mental abnormality” or “mental 
disorder,” whichever term is used, as a mental condition that affects the 
emotional or volitional capacity of a person and predisposes that person 
to sexual violence.102  While most states use “emotional or volitional 
                                                 
99 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701(7)(b) (using “likely” as the standard in defining a 
sexually violent person); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a)(1) (stating that a sexually 
violent predator is someone “likely [to] engage in sexually violent criminal behavior”); 
D.C. CODE § 22-3803(1) (West 2001) (explaining that a sexual psychopath is someone 
“likely” to attack others); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(10)(b) (defining a sexually violent 
predator as someone “likely” to engage in sexual violence); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(11) 
(finding a sexually violent predator to be someone who is “likely” to engage in sexual 
violence); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (defining a sexually violent predator as someone 
“likely” to engage in sexual violence); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A, § 1 (stating that a 
sexually dangerous person is someone “likely” to attack or inflict injury because of 
uncontrollable desires); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-174.01(1) (defining a dangerous sex offender 
as someone “likely” to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 135-E:2(XII)(b) (stating that a sexually violent predator is someone who is “likely” to be 
sexually violent); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (defining a sexually violent predator as 
someone “likely” to engage in sexual violence); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(e) (stating 
that a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement is someone “likely” to be a danger to 
others and commit sex offenses); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8) (explaining that a 
sexually dangerous individual is someone “likely” to engage in sexually predatory 
conduct); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(1)(b) (finding a sexually violent predator to be 
someone who is “likely” to engage in sexual violence); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (defining 
a sexually violent predator as someone “likely” to engage in sexual violence); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(18) (stating that a sexually violent predator is someone who is 
“likely” to be sexually violent); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7) (defining a sexually violent 
person as someone “likely” to engage in one or more acts of sexual violence). 
100 See MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (defining a sexually violent predator as “any person 
who suffers from a mental abnormality which makes the person more likely than not to 
engage in . . . sexual violence”). 
101 See infra notes 102–05 (discussing the definitions that some states provide for key 
terms in their sexual predator laws). 
102 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(c) (defining a diagnosed mental disorder as a 
congenital or acquired condition that affects the “emotional or volitional capacity” of an 
individual and predisposes that person to sexual violence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(5) 
(stating that a mental abnormality is a mental condition affecting an individual’s 
“emotional or volitional capacity” that predisposes that individual to sexual violence); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(5) (explaining that a mental abnormality is a condition affecting 
the “emotional or volitional capacity” of a person and predisposing that person to sexually 
violent acts); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (defining a mental abnormality as a congenital 
or acquired condition that affects the “emotional or volitional capacity” of an individual in 
a manner which predisposes that person to sexual violence); MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(2) 
(explaining that a mental abnormality is a condition that affects the “emotional or volitional 
capacity” of an individual which predisposes that person to sexually violent acts); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2(VII) (noting that a mental abnormality is a mental condition 
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capacity” in their definitions, “cognitive” is also used occasionally.103  
Some states also define what it means to be “likely” to commit sexually 
violent acts.104  For example, the “likely” standard has been defined as 
meaning more likely than not.105  While statutory definitions offer courts 
                                                                                                             
affecting an individual’s “emotional or volitional capacity” in such a manner that it 
predisposes that person to sexual violence); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30(3) (stating that a 
mental abnormality is a mental condition that affects an individual’s “emotional or 
volitional capacity” which predisposes that individual to sexual violence); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 37.2-900 (defining both mental abnormality and personality disorder as conditions 
affecting a person’s “emotional or volitional capacity” that make the person likely to be 
sexually violent); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(8) (explaining that a mental 
abnormality is a condition affecting an individual’s “emotional or volitional capacity” that 
predisposes the individual to sexual violence); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(2) (defining a 
mental disorder as a condition that affects the “emotional or volitional capacity” of an 
individual in such a manner that it predisposes the individual to sexual violence).  With the 
exception of Virginia and Washington, the states that use “personality disorder” in their 
sexual predator laws do not define it.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912 (including no 
definition of “personality disorder”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (omitting a definition of 
“personality disorder”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2 (leaving out a statutory definition 
of “personality disorder”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (including no definition of 
“personality disorder”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-48-30 (omitting a definition of “personality 
disorder”); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-900 (including a definition of “personality 
disorder” within a definition of “mental abnormality”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 71.09.020(9) (defining “personality disorder”).  For the purposes of this Note, it makes no 
difference because the Illinois law does not use the term “personality disorder.”  Likewise, 
the Illinois sexual violent predator law omits any reference to a personality disorder.  See 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5 (West 2008).  When defining a mental disorder or mental 
abnormality, the “emotional or volitional capacity” language is standard in sexual predator 
laws because the Kansas sexual predator law that was twice upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court contains “emotional or volitional capacity” in its definition of a mental 
abnormality.  See supra Part II.B (discussing Hendricks and Crane, cases which upheld the 
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act). 
103 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (using the phrase “emotional, cognitive or volitional 
capacity” in defining a mental abnormality); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(i) (stating that 
a mental abnormality can affect the “emotional, cognitive, or volitional capacity of a 
person”). 
104 See infra note 105 (discussing the definitions that some states provide for the “likely” 
standard in their sexual predator laws). 
105 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 229A.2(4) (defining “[l]ikely to engage in predatory acts of 
sexual violence” as meaning  that a person more likely than not will be sexually violent); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(7) (stating that “[l]ikely to engage in predatory acts of 
sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility” means the person more probably than 
not will be sexually violent if released from detention); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(1m) 
(defining “likely” as “more likely than not”).  Although not the standard, Wisconsin 
defines “substantially probable” as “much more likely than not.”  Id. § 980.01(9).  An 
alternative definition to the “likely” standard that some states use is that “likely” means the 
individual’s propensity towards sexual violence is of such a degree that the individual is a 
threat to the health and safety of others.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.912(4) (stating that 
“[l]ikely to engage in acts of sexual violence” means the individual’s propensities towards 
sexual violence are such that the individual is a menace to the health and safety of others); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(c) (defining “[l]ikely to engage in repeat acts of sexual 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 [2011], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss2/4
2011] Redefining Sexually Violent Person in Illinois 573 
the most guidance for analyzing sexual predator laws, it is also useful to 
look at the definitions found in mental health manuals and dictionaries 
in order to fully understand key terminology.106 
2. The DSM and Other Key Definitions 
The DSM is a diagnostic tool designed to aid those in the mental 
health community in identifying and treating mental conditions, 
disorders, and abnormalities.107  The DSM explains that a mental 
disorder is conceptualized as a behavioral or psychological syndrome or 
pattern that is associated with distress, disability, or a significantly 
increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or loss of freedom.108  
The syndrome or pattern cannot merely be an expected and socially 
accepted response to a certain event.109  The DSM qualifies its 
                                                                                                             
violence” as meaning the person’s propensities towards sexually violent acts are of such a 
degree that the person is a menace to the health and safety of others); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-
174.01(2) (saying that “[l]ikely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence” means a person’s 
propensity to commit sex offenses is of such a degree that he is a menace to the health and 
safety of others); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-E:2(VI) (explaining that “[l]ikely to engage in 
acts of sexual violence” means that the person’s propensity to commit sexually violent acts 
is of such a degree that the person has serious difficulty controlling behavior and is a 
danger to others); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.26 (stating that “[l]ikely to engage in acts of 
sexual violence” means the individual’s propensities towards sexually violent acts are of 
such a degree that the individual is a threat to the health and safety of others); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 44-48-30(9) (defining “[l]ikely to engage in acts of sexual violence” as meaning the 
person’s propensities towards sexual violence are of such a degree that the person is a 
menace to others’ health and safety). 
106 See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing the language of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders as well as common dictionary definitions). 
107 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS xxiii–xxiv (4th ed., Text Revision 2000) [hereinafter DSM]; see Cornwell, supra 
note 25, at 1321 (explaining that the DSM is a diagnostic system used to aid clinicians in 
identifying and treating mental health impairments).  The most recent edition of the DSM 
is referred to as the DSM-IV because it is the fourth edition of the manual.  John Cloud, 
Redefining Crazy:  Researchers Revise the DSM, TIME (March 11, 2009), 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1884092,00.html.  The DSM-IV was 
originally published in 1994.  Id.  The fifth edition, to be referred to as the DSM-V, is set for 
publication in 2012.  Id. 
108 DSM, supra note 107, at xxxi.  The full conceptualization of a mental disorder is a 
clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern 
that occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress 
(e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more 
important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of 
suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom. 
Id. 
109 Id.  The DSM refers to the death of a loved one as an example of an event which gives 
rise to an expected and socially accepted response.  Id.  The DSM goes on to further explain 
the following: 
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conceptualization by noting that there is an inherent difficulty in 
defining the term “mental disorder” because there is much of the 
physical in mental disorders and vice versa; thus, the term “mental 
disorder” implies a distinction where oftentimes a distinction does not 
exist.110  Additionally, the DSM acknowledges that the term “mental 
disorder” lacks a consistent operational definition.111 
Despite its focus on diagnosing mental disorders, the United States 
Supreme Court has explained that medical science, and therefore the 
DSM, does not play a role in whether sexually violent individuals can be 
civilly committed.112  In fact, the Hendricks Court acknowledged that 
legislatures typically have the responsibility of defining medical terms 
with legal significance.113  However, given the fact that experts often look 
to the DSM for guidance when making SVPA civil commitment 
determinations, its language and concepts are helpful for analysis 
purposes.114 
                                                                                                             
Whatever its original cause, it must currently be considered a 
manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction 
in the individual.  Neither deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or 
sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual and 
society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a 
symptom of a dysfunction in the individual. 
Id. 
110 Id. at xxx. 
111 Id. 
112 See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (explaining psychiatry informs but does 
not control legal determinations); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358–59 (1997) 
(rejecting the idea that psychiatrists and the medical community must agree on certain 
terminology and concepts before civilly committing sexually violent individuals).  The 
Hendricks Court was faced with an argument that the term “mental abnormality,” which 
the Kansas legislature used in the Sexually Violent Predator Act, was not a valid term for 
the purposes of civil commitment.  Id. at 358–59.  Hendricks argued that “mental illness” 
needed to be used instead because it was accepted by the psychiatric community.  Id.  The 
Court rejected this, reasoning that courts and the medical community have disagreed 
frequently on what constitutes mental illness and that a variety of terms have been used to 
describe individuals subject to civil commitment.  Id. at 359.  Furthermore, the Court 
upheld the Kansas Act despite no reference to the DSM in any of the statutory definitions.  
Id. at 360; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (Supp. 2008) (making no reference to the 
DSM in any of the statutory definitions). 
113 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359. 
114 See People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 740–41 (Ill. 2003) (discussing the SDPA, 
closely related to the SVPA, and involving a court determination based on an expert’s DSM 
diagnosis and the respondent’s past sexual misconduct that the respondent was sexually 
dangerous); In re Det. of Lieberman, 884 N.E.2d 160, 176–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (involving 
state experts who used the DSM for their evaluations, but did not base their diagnosis 
solely on the DSM’s criteria). 
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It is also helpful to consider dictionary definitions when trying to 
ascertain the meaning of statutory language.115  “Substantially” means 
ample or considerable in amount or quantity.116  “Substantially” is also 
defined as real in worth or value.117  “Probable” means having “more 
evidence for than against.”118  Due to their prominence in the SVPA’s 
construction and interpretation, “emotional” and “volitional” are also 
worth defining.119  “Emotional” is defined as prone to emotion, with 
“emotion” being defined as “a state of feeling.”120  “Volitional” refers to 
the ability to make a choice or determination.121 
Dictionary definitions are useful for interpreting some of the 
statutory language found in modern sexual predator laws.122  Courts 
only look to dictionaries, however, when the statutory language leaves 
gaps to be filled.123  The mental health community offers a 
conceptualization of one of the key terms, mental disorder, but 
acknowledges that a precise definition is difficult to compose.124  These 
authorities, along with judicial interpretations and comparable laws in 
                                                 
115 E.g., In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1157 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (explaining that 
when a statute does not define a term, courts may look to dictionary definitions in order to 
derive the term’s plain and ordinary meaning). 
116 WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1126 (2005) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S II NEW 
COLLEGE]. 
117 Id. 
118 Bailey, 740 N.E.2d at 1156 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990)).  
Another offered definition for “probable” is “evidence that inclines the mind to belief but 
leaves some room for doubt.”  WEBSTER’S UNIVERSAL COLLEGE DICTIONARY 629–30 (1997); 
see also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 989 (11th ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S] (defining “probable” as “supported by evidence strong enough to 
establish presumption but not proof” as well as “likely to be or become true or real”). 
119 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(b) (West 2008) (using the phrase “emotional or 
volitional capacity” in defining mental disorder). 
120 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra note 118, at 408.  “Emotional incapacity” can be defined 
for legal purposes as the “inability to control one’s emotions or express appropriate 
emotions because of a mental disorder.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (9th ed. 2009) 
[hereinafter BLACK’S]. 
121 BLACK’S, supra note 120, at 1710.  An additional definition of “volition” describes it as 
“the power of choosing” and makes a cross-reference to “will.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S, supra 
note 118, at 1401. 
122 See supra notes 117–21 (discussing the common usage definitions found in 
dictionaries). 
123 See In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1156 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (analyzing the 
dictionary meaning of “substantially probable” in order to apply the standard absent a 
statutory definition). 
124 See supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text (offering a conceptualization of mental 
disorder, but also explaining the difficulties in precisely defining the term). 
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other jurisdictions, help establish a foundation for analyzing the precise 
language in the SVPA.125 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The SVPA and the language it uses are constitutional.126  This 
language defines a sexually violent person as an individual who suffers 
from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the 
individual will commit sexual violence.127  Although the SVPA survives 
constitutional scrutiny, it does not automatically mean that the SVPA is 
perfectly constructed.128  Controversy surrounds the two terms used to 
define a sexually violent person:  mental disorder and substantially 
probable.129  Because these two terms are capable of taking away an 
individual’s freedom indefinitely, an extended analysis is worthwhile.130 
This Part first analyzes the meaning of the SVPA’s mental disorder 
language.131  Specifically, it addresses certain language used in the 
mental disorder definition as well as medical science’s role in defining a 
mental disorder.132  Next, this Part turns to the substantially probable 
standard used in the SVPA.133  It analyzes this standard in comparison to 
the constitutionally approved “likely” standard, and also addresses the 
                                                 
125 See infra Part III (analyzing the SVPA’s terminology in light of statutory language, 
judicial interpretation, and various other authorities). 
126 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the SVPA’s approval in light of both Hendricks and 
Crane). 
127 See supra note 68 (discussing the SVPA’s definition of a sexually violent person). 
128 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the problems posed by the mental disorder language of 
the SVPA); infra Part III.B (analyzing the problematic “substantially probable” standard the 
SVPA employs). 
129 See In re Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ill. 2003) (analyzing the mental disorder 
language of the SVPA); In re Det. of Isbell, 777 N.E.2d 994, 998–99 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) 
(addressing a challenge to the mental disorder definition used in the SVPA); In re Det. of 
Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (addressing the respondent’s argument that 
“substantially probable” can be reduced to mathematical terms); In re Det. of Bailey, 740 
N.E.2d 1146, 1155–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (involving an argument that “substantially 
probable” is unconstitutionally vague); In re Det. of Walker, 731 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2000) (discussing whether or not “substantially probable” is definable in percentages). 
130 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the mental disorder definition and interpretation in the 
SVPA); infra Part III.B (analyzing the “substantially probable” standard used in the SVPA). 
131 See infra Part III.A (discussing the interpretation of the mental disorder language in 
the SVPA). 
132 See infra Part III.A.1 (critiquing the interpretation of the “emotional or volitional 
capacity” language in the SVPA’s mental disorder definition); infra Part III.A.2 (explaining 
why the DSM cannot be wholly determinative when it comes to assessing whether an 
individual has a mental disorder). 
133 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the “substantially probable” standard that the SVPA 
uses). 
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argument that “substantially probable” can be reduced to a specific 
percentage.134 
A. Mental Disorder and Its Meaning in the SVPA 
The SVPA defines the term “mental disorder” as a condition 
affecting the “emotional or volitional capacity” that predisposes a person 
to sexual violence.135  Courts have accepted this definition despite its 
reference to an unknown “emotional capacity” and despite the fact that 
it does not rely on the medical science community’s understanding of 
what constitutes a mental disorder.136  This Part addresses those issues in 
turn.137  Part III.A.1 discusses the key inquiry under the SVPA and 
critiques how that inquiry ignores certain statutory language.138  Part 
III.A.2 then explains how the refusal to mix medical and legal 
terminology when defining a mental disorder is actually one of the 
SVPA’s strengths.139 
1. The Key Inquiry and How “Emotional Capacity” Has Been Ignored 
The Illinois Supreme Court has rejected the idea that “emotional” 
and “volitional” refer to separate capacities.  Instead, the court has taken 
the position that the Illinois legislature simply wanted to make its 
language as inclusive as possible.140  The view that “emotional” and 
“volitional” do not refer to separate capacities is problematic for the 
SVPA.141  As an initial matter, the current interpretation of “emotional or 
volitional capacity” does not give accord to the plain and ordinary 
                                                 
134 See infra Part III.B.1 (comparing “substantially probable” to the “likely” standard 
upheld in Hendricks); infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing whether “substantially probable” can be 
defined in mathematical terms). 
135 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(b) (West 2008); see also supra note 70 (giving the 
SVPA’s full definition of mental disorder). 
136 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(b) (omitting any reference to the DSM when 
defining a mental disorder); infra notes 140–50 (discussing the interpretation of “emotional 
capacity” and how it has not yet been determined to what that capacity refers). 
137 See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the “emotional capacity” language and how it has 
been ignored); infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the reasons for not relying on medical science 
when defining “mental defects” in the law). 
138 See infra Part III.A.1 (analyzing the “volitional capacity” language and explaining how 
it has dominated the statutory interpretation of a mental disorder under the SVPA). 
139 See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing why the DSM cannot provide the SVPA’s mental 
disorder definition). 
140 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Varner position that the Illinois legislature did not 
use the terms “emotional” and “volitional” as a way to differentiate between individuals 
who are capable of controlling their sexually violent behavior and those who are not). 
141 See infra notes 142–52 and accompanying text (explaining why “emotional” and 
“volitional” should be interpreted as separate capacities). 
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meaning of the language.142  Legislatures choose specific terminology for 
a reason and each term is supposed to be given equal weight.143  Illinois 
courts, however, have rendered the “emotional capacity” language 
meaningless by including it in the “volitional capacity” inquiry.144 
While Illinois courts have acknowledged that the “inability to 
control sexually violent behavior is a sine qua non” under the SVPA, they 
have overlooked the fact that this indispensible condition is completely 
covered by the “volitional capacity” language.145  “Volitional capacity,” 
when interpreted according to its plain dictionary definition, means the 
capacity to choose or act according to one’s will.146  When substituted 
into the definition of mental disorder, this interpretation covers the key 
inquiry under the SVPA:  whether an individual can control his or her 
sexually violent acts.147  Thus, Illinois courts have rendered “emotional 
                                                 
142 See In re Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ill. 2003) (taking the position that the 
Illinois legislature did not intend emotional or volitional capacity to refer to separate 
capacities, thereby rendering the emotional capacity language meaningless and focusing on 
the lack-of-control determination). 
143 See In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1156–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (acknowledging 
that the best evidence of a legislature’s intent is the language itself, and that statutory 
language must interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning).  See generally In re 
Det. of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (explaining that statutes must be 
interpreted so as to give effect to the legislature’s intent and to avoid constitutional 
difficulties and inconvenience). 
144 See Varner, 800 N.E.2d at 797 (concluding that “emotional capacity” is just an 
additional term used in assessing whether an individual can control his or her sexually 
violent behavior). 
145 See id. (explaining that the key condition which must be present to civilly commit 
pursuant to the SVPA is an inability to control sexually violent acts); supra note 121 and 
accompanying text (defining volitional as the ability to make a choice or determination); see 
also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 414 (2002) (explaining that Hendricks, the case 
establishing that sexually violent individuals could be civilly committed, limited its 
discussion to volitional disabilities). 
146  See supra note 121 (giving a definition of “volitional” as the ability to choose or act 
according to one’s will). 
147 See supra note 79–80 and accompanying text (discussing the major inquiry when 
civilly committing individuals pursuant to the SVPA).  When the dictionary definition of 
“volitional capacity” is substituted into the SVPA’s mental disorder language, the 
definition of a mental disorder becomes the following:  a congenital or acquired condition 
affecting the capacity to choose or act according to one’s will, which predisposes a person 
to engage in sexual violence.  See supra note 70 (discussing the actual statutory definition of 
a mental disorder).  This definition, which completely disregards any “emotional capacity” 
language, almost mirrors the current interpretation of the SVPA’s mental disorder 
definition, which actually includes the term “emotional capacity.”  See Varner, 800 N.E.2d at 
797 (discussing the “emotional capacity” and “volitional capacity” language in light of the 
SVPA’s key inquiry). 
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capacity” ambiguous and meaningless through their current 
interpretation.148 
An additional problem with drawing no distinction between 
“emotional” and “volitional” capacities is that it actually serves to limit 
the SVPA’s application.149  It is well recognized by the judiciary that 
medical science terms are constantly changing.150  Illinois courts have 
prevented themselves from applying “emotional capacity” to an 
additional mental health condition, which may not have even been 
articulated yet, by taking the position that “emotional” and “volitional” 
refer to the same capacity.  The “volitional” language clearly covers the 
main inquiry:  whether an individual can control his or her behavior.151  
Thus, Illinois could have relied on the “volitional capacity” in making its 
Crane and Hendricks analyses, while reserving the “emotional capacity” 
for a future mental health condition.152  This would have not only left the 
Illinois courts some flexibility but also reserved a separate capacity that 
could be applied to SVPs in the future. 
As illustrated above, the precise language used helps determine 
whether or not someone qualifies for commitment under the SVPA.153  
The mental disorder language is particularly important because it 
encompasses the primary inquiry for purposes of civil commitment.154  
Although the presence of a mental disorder plays a prominent role in 
determining whether someone will be committed pursuant to the SVPA, 
the case law clearly states that the mental health community’s language 
is not controlling when determining if someone has a mental disorder.155 
                                                 
148 See supra notes 142–47 (explaining that the Illinois interpretation of mental disorder 
has rendered the “emotional capacity” language in the mental disorder definition 
meaningless). 
149 See infra notes 150–52 and accompanying text (explaining that Illinois’s interpretation 
of mental disorder actually limits the SVPA’s applicability to sexually violent individuals). 
150 See, e.g., Crane, 534 U.S. at 413 (explaining that the field of mental health is continually 
advancing); Varner, 800 N.E.2d at 797 (noting that medical science’s understanding of 
mental conditions is constantly evolving). 
151 See supra note 147 (explaining that the main inquiry under the SVPA is covered by the 
“volitional capacity” language in the statutory definition of a mental disorder). 
152 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court’s view of the SVPA in light 
of both Hendricks and Crane). 
153 See supra notes 135–52 and accompanying text (illustrating the importance of the 
language used in the SVPA). 
154 See supra notes 140–47 (discussing the primary inquiry under the SVPA). 
155 See infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the reasons why medical terminology is not 
controlling in the context of the SVPA). 
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2. The DSM and Why It Does Not Play a Role in SVPA Civil 
Commitments 
Illinois has correctly taken the position that medical science 
terminology is not controlling in the context of SVPA civil 
commitments.156  The DSM cannot be relied on in committing SVPs 
because important distinctions exist between clinical and legal 
viewpoints on mental abnormalities, disorders, and diseases.157  A 
clinical diagnosis under the DSM, standing alone, does not translate into 
a specified legal standard.158  In fact, the DSM acknowledges that simply 
diagnosing a mental disorder does not necessarily imply that an 
individual can or cannot control behaviors associated with the 
disorder.159  Given that the SVPA currently requires a lack-of-volitional-
control over sexually violent behavior, the DSM simply acts as a brick in 
                                                 
156 See In re Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ill. 2003) (explaining that because medical 
science’s understanding of mental health is constantly evolving, the Illinois legislature used 
the terms “emotional” and “volitional” in the mental disorder definition “simply to insure 
that everyone who is unable to control his or her sexually violent behavior is covered by 
the [SVPA]”); In re Det. of Lieberman, 929 N.E.2d 616, 632 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).  The 
respondent 
cites to no authority in which a court has found that due process is 
violated when a person is committed under a sexually violent person 
statute based upon a mental disorder that is not specifically listed in 
the DSM.  Indeed, the [SVPA] does not require that there be a 
consensus among mental health professionals regarding a diagnosis or 
that the diagnosis be listed specifically in the DSM in order for that 
particular diagnosis to support a sexually violent person finding. 
Id. 
157 Cornwell, supra note 25, at 1320–21.  Legal definitions of mental abnormalities are not 
based exclusively on therapy and treatment.  Id. at 1321.  Legal definitions must take into 
account other concerns, such as moral responsibility, safety, and due process.  Id.  
“[A]ttempting to graft one system completely onto the other” cannot be done.  Id.  
Furthermore, the DSM has gone through numerous revisions and versions, adding certain 
conditions and subtracting others; were the DSM relied on to commit sexually violent 
individuals, someone may be considered sexually violent one day and found safe the next.  
Id. at 1321–22; see also DSM, supra note 107, at xxiii (explaining that the DSM is intended to 
be a helpful tool for practicing mental health professionals; furthermore, the DSM is aimed 
at clinicians and relies on extensive empirical data). 
158 See DSM, supra note 107, at xxxiii.  There is an imperfect fit between questions of law 
and questions of clinical diagnosis.  Id.  Typically, the clinical diagnosis of a mental 
disorder is not enough to establish a mental disorder, disease, or defect for the purposes of 
the law.  Id.  The diagnosis of a legal standard related to mental health, for example 
competence or criminal responsibility, usually requires additional information beyond that 
which is required to make a clinical diagnosis.  Id. 
159 See id. (“[T]he fact that an individual’s presentation meets the criteria for a DSM-IV 
diagnosis does not carry any necessary implication regarding the individual’s degree of 
control over the behaviors that may be associated with the disorder.”). 
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the wall of evidence required to commit an SVP.160  Accordingly, the 
SVPA’s current use of the DSM as a helpful guide, but not a controlling 
factor, is one of the SVPA’s strengths.161  While useful for diagnostic 
purposes, the DSM is not mentioned in the SVPA’s definition of a mental 
disorder.162  The Illinois legislature, nonetheless, saw fit to draft a 
definition of the term.163  The SVPA, however, does not define 
“substantially probable,” leaving Illinois courts to fill in the gaps that the 
legislature left behind.164 
B. The “Substantially Probable” Standard and the Role of Math in Civil 
Commitment 
The “substantially probable” language serves as the standard of 
whether an individual can be civilly committed within the SVPA’s 
definition of a sexually violent person.165  Given the lack of a statutory 
definition, Illinois courts have been forced to interpret and define what 
“substantially probable” means.166  Through such analysis, courts have 
defined “substantially probable” to mean “much more likely than 
not.”167  Part III.B.1 compares the substantially probable standard to the 
“likely” standard that was upheld in Hendricks and Crane, and it explains 
                                                 
160 See People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735, 740–41 (Ill. 2003) (dealing with the SDPA, 
closely related to the SVPA, and involving a determination by the court based on an 
expert’s DSM diagnosis and the respondent’s past sexual misconduct that the respondent 
was a sexually dangerous person); In re Det. of Lieberman, 884 N.E.2d 160, 176–77 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2007) (involving state experts who used the DSM for some of their evaluations but did 
not base their recommendation solely on the DSM diagnosis).  In Masterson, the sexually 
dangerous person determination was actually reversed and remanded in order to ensure 
compliance with the newly announced Crane standard; however, the evidence at the initial 
commitment hearing was sufficient to comply with the Hendricks standard.  Masterson, 798 
N.E.2d at 749; see also DSM, supra note 107, at xxxiii (noting that the DSM is probably best 
reserved in the legal context for assisting decision makers in their determinations). 
161 See supra notes 157–60 (explaining why the DSM is incompatible with the SVPA’s 
standards and language). 
162 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(b) (West 2008) (omitting any reference to the 
DSM when defining a mental disorder). 
163 See id. (defining mental disorder). 
164 See id. at 207/5 (failing to define “substantially probable” despite using it to define a 
sexually violent person); infra Part III.B (analyzing the judicial interpretation of the SVPA’s 
“substantially probable” language). 
165 See id. at 207/5(f) (explaining that in order to be an SVP, and thus subject to 
commitment under the SVPA, an individual must have “a mental disorder that makes it 
substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence”). 
166 See supra notes 72–75 (discussing the statutory construction surrounding the 
“substantially probable” language and how “substantially probable” has been defined and 
interpreted). 
167 See supra note 74 (explaining that Illinois courts have found “substantially probable” 
to mean “much more likely than not”). 
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that the SVPA’s standard is needlessly high.168  Finally, Part III.B.2 
explains that Illinois courts have correctly refused to assign a specific 
number to the “substantially probable” standard.169 
1. “Substantially Probable” as a Needlessly High Standard 
The substantially probable standard that the SVPA uses is 
problematic for Illinois because it is needlessly higher than the standard 
approved in Hendricks and Crane.170  The Kansas law upheld in both 
Hendricks and Crane stated that a person could be civilly committed if 
that person was “likely” to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence.171  
The SVPA does not use “likely” as the standard but instead opts for 
substantially probable.172  Illinois courts have found that substantially 
probable is higher than or equal to the standard upheld in Hendricks and 
Crane, and they base their decision on the meaning of substantially 
probable, which is defined as “much more likely than not.”173 
By looking at the plain construction of the phrases, it would appear 
that the SVPA’s standard of “substantially probable” is clearly higher 
than the “likely” standard approved in Hendricks and Crane.174  Whereas 
the Hendricks and Crane standard is “likely,” the SVPA standard adds 
“much more” and “than not” to the standard.175  The Kansas law at issue 
                                                 
168 See infra Part III.B.1 (comparing the “substantially probable” standard to the “likely” 
standard and arguing that the “substantially probable” standard is higher than is 
constitutionally required). 
169 See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing whether “substantially probable” can be reduced to a 
specific percentage). 
170 See supra Part II.B (discussing Hendricks and Crane, United States Supreme Court cases 
that upheld a Kansas sexual predator law that allows for civil commitment of an individual 
who is “likely” to engage in sexual violence); infra notes 171–84 (illustrating that the 
SVPA’s substantially probable standard is higher than the “likely” standard found 
constitutionally permissible in Hendricks and Crane). 
171 See supra note 49 (explaining the standards at issue with the Kansas sexual predator 
law and when civil commitment was allowed under it); supra note 99 (noting that the 
Kansas law, like many other sexual predator laws, uses a “likely” standard); see also In re 
Det. of Varner, 800 N.E.2d 794, 796–99 (Ill. 2003) (offering a thorough discussion of the 
Hendricks and Crane decisions). 
172 See supra note 68 (giving the definition of sexually violent person, which states that an 
individual may be civilly committed if he is substantially probable to be sexually violent). 
173 See In re Det. of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (explaining that the 
definition of “substantially probable” as “much more likely than not” satisfies the 
standards set forth in Hendricks). 
174 See infra notes 175–79 (analyzing the respective standards and discussing how 
“substantially probable” has been interpreted as a higher standard than “likely”). 
175 See supra note 74 (discussing the Illinois definition of “substantially probable”); supra 
note 49 (explaining that the Kansas law allows a sexually violent predator to be committed 
if he is “likely” to be sexually violent); supra note 99 (stating that the Kansas Sexually 
Violent Predator Act uses a “likely” standard). 
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in Hendricks and Crane offers a definition of “[l]ikely to engage in repeat 
acts of sexual violence,” but it does not offer a clear definition of the 
“likely” term in particular.176  Meanwhile other states, modeling their 
statutory language and “likely” standard on the Kansas Sexually Violent 
Predator Act, clearly define “likely” as meaning “more likely than 
not.”177  Thus, the SVPA standard of substantially probable adds the 
word “much” and thereby requires a higher probability of sexual 
violence than the “likely” standard approved in Hendricks.178  
Accordingly, fact finders in civil commitment cases under the SVPA 
must be convinced the individual is much more, not just more, likely 
than not to be sexually violent.179 
The concept that “substantially probable” is a higher standard than 
“likely” is further supported by looking at dictionary definitions, which 
is what Illinois courts did when they formulated their definition of 
substantially probable.180  “Substantially” means considerable in amount, 
value, or quantity.181  “Probable” can be defined as having more 
evidence for than against.182  When combined, a “substantially probable” 
standard based solely on dictionary definitions would require having 
                                                 
176 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a02(c) (2005 & Supp. 2009) (defining “likely” as 
“mean[ing] the person’s propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as 
to pose a menace to the health and safety of others”); supra note 105 (explaining the Kansas 
sexual predator law). 
177 See supra note 105 (noting that Iowa and Wisconsin have defined “likely” as meaning 
“more likely than not,” while Washington has defined “likely” as “more probably than 
not”).  In fact, Missouri actually uses the language “more likely than not” in its definition of 
a “sexually violent predator;” by doing so, it subtracts the step of using a “likely” standard 
and defining that term separately.  See MO. ANN. STAT. § 632.480(5) (West 2006) (explaining 
that a sexually violent predator is an individual who is “more likely than not” to engage in 
sexual violence). 
178 Compare supra note 74 (discussing the judicially established definition of “substantially 
probable,” which is defined as “much more likely than not”), with supra note 100 
(explaining that Missouri uses the language “more likely than not” in its sexually violent 
predator definition, thereby cutting out the added step of using a “likely” standard and 
defining it separately), and supra note 105 (discussing the states which define the “likely” 
standard as meaning “more likely than not”). 
179 See supra note 178 (comparing the various standards used and looking at the 
additional language in the “substantially probable” definition, which serves to raise its 
standard when compared to “likely”). 
180 See In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1156–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (looking to a 
Wisconsin interpretation of “substantially probable,” which relied on dictionary definitions 
in formulating its definition); infra notes 181–83 and accompanying text (analyzing what 
“substantially probable” means in light of dictionary definitions). 
181 See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text (discussing the various dictionary 
definitions of “substantially”). 
182 See supra note 118 (discussing the definition or “probable”). 
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considerably more evidence for than against.183  When compared to the 
“likely” definition of “more likely than not,” the dictionary definition of 
“substantially probable” clearly requires a higher likelihood of sexual 
violence.184 
The higher standard that the SVPA uses poses problems for Illinois 
and its enforcement of the SVPA.  By employing a higher standard than 
is necessary, the SVPA needlessly limits itself.  A lower standard has 
been constitutionally accepted, but the SVPA does not employ that 
standard.185  Thus, the SVPA does not reach individuals who are civilly 
committed pursuant to sexual predator laws in other states.  The higher 
standard found in the SVPA allows sexually violent individuals to go 
free in Illinois while those same individuals might be subject to 
potentially indefinite civil commitment in other states. 
Due to the lack of a statutory definition, Illinois courts were forced to 
define “substantially probable”; they concluded that it means “much 
more likely than not.”186  However, questions can still surround statutory 
language and subject it to challenge even with judicially created 
definitions in place.187  An additional issue related to the “substantially 
probable” standard is whether or not it can be reduced to a percentage.188 
2. “Substantially Probable” and Why It Cannot Be Reduced to a 
Number 
Illinois courts have defined “substantially probable” as meaning 
“much more likely than not.”189  Illinois courts, however, have refused to 
                                                 
183 See supra notes 181–82 and accompanying text (defining what “substantially” and 
“probable” mean). 
184 Compare supra note 105 (explaining that “likely” has been defined as meaning “more 
likely than not”), with supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing what a 
“substantially probable” definition would look like based solely on dictionary meanings). 
185 See supra Part II.B (discussing the constitutional standards that due process requires in 
regards to civil commitment); supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the SVPA and the language it 
uses). 
186 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5 (West 2008) (omitting a definition of 
“substantially probable”). 
187 See In re Det. of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (analyzing and rejecting 
an argument that Hendricks established a mathematical standard for due process to be 
satisfied); In re Det. of Walker, 731 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (involving an 
argument by the respondent that “substantially probable” could be reduced a 
mathematical formula). 
188 See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing whether “substantially probable” can be reduced to a 
mathematical formula). 
189 See supra note 74 (discussing the Illinois courts’ definition of “substantially probable” 
as “much more likely than not”). 
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assign a specific number to the definition of “substantially probable.”190  
Despite the fact that Hendricks upheld a “likely” standard, definable as 
“more likely than not,” Illinois has not found that a particular 
mathematical standard satisfies due process.191  The judiciary’s refusal to 
assign a specific number to “substantially probable” is one of the SVPA’s 
strengths.192 
Although experts are sometimes willing to testify that a potential 
SVP has a specific percentage chance of engaging in sexual violence, 
there is no reason for the Illinois courts to handcuff enforcement of the 
SVPA by assigning a specific number to one of the SVPA’s key 
inquiries.193  Requiring that “substantially probable” be defined in 
mathematical terms would ask for precision in an imprecise field.194  
Even the Crane Court acknowledged that mathematical precision is not 
always possible when it comes to lack-of-control determinations.195  
Additionally, experts called who give such mathematical probabilities 
would oftentimes disagree about whether an individual even has a 
mental disorder, as well as what percent chance that the individual will 
commit another offense if a mental disorder is found.196  Lastly, given the 
                                                 
190 See Hayes, 747 N.E.2d at 453 (explaining that the Supreme Court in Hendricks did not 
establish a mathematical standard which allows for the commitment of SVPs); Walker, 731 
N.E.2d at 1002 (rejecting the idea that “substantially probable” under the SVPA can be 
reduced to a percentage). 
191 See Hayes, 747 N.E.2d at 453 (rejecting the idea that Hendricks established a due process 
standard in mathematical terms).  The Hayes court elaborated on the idea of a mathematical 
standard by stating that 
[r]espondent argues that under Hendricks a person may be committed 
as a sexually violent person only if she or he is more likely than not to 
commit an act of sexual violence in the future.  Recast in mathematical 
terms, respondent’s argument requires a probability of reoffense 
greater than .5 or 50%.  We do not believe that the Supreme Court 
identified a mathematical standard when it held that the “likely” 
standard used in the Kansas legislation complied with due process.  
The question of substantial probability under the Act cannot be 
reduced to mere percentages. 
Id. (citing Walker, 731 N.E.2d at 994). 
192 See infra notes 193–97 and accompanying text (discussing why the reduction of 
“substantially probable” to a mathematical formula would only serve to limit the SVPA 
and restrict its application to SVPs). 
193 See Walker, 731 N.E.2d at 1002 (mentioning that the respondent offered two expert 
opinions, each of which gave a specific percent chance of the respondent reoffending over 
the next ten years); supra Part II.B (discussing the Kansas sexual predator law that was 
found to be constitutional despite using only a “likely” standard). 
194 See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985) (stating that psychiatry is not an exact 
science). 
195 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). 
196 E.g., Walker, 731 N.E.2d at 1002 (involving experts who disagreed over the alleged 
SVP’s recidivism rate, one expert placing the chance of reoffending at thirty-seven percent 
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Supreme Court’s omission of any mathematical formula or specific 
numerical requirement in order to civilly commit sexually violent 
individuals, requiring that experts predict a certain percent chance of 
reoffending before commitment would only serve to limit enforcement 
of the SVPA.197 
Having looked at the SVPA’s sexually violent person definition, 
certain strengths and weaknesses are present.198  While the SVPA does 
not make the mistake of relying solely on the DSM for its mental 
disorder determinations, certain key language is ignored by the courts.199  
The “substantially probable” language, while not reducible to a 
mathematical formula, limits the SVPA’s applicability through a 
needlessly high standard.200  Although currently constitutional, the 
SVPA could broaden its applicability to reach more potential SVPs while 
retaining its constitutionality through some careful adjustments to the 
statutory language.201 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The meaning of the term “sexually violent person” turns on what the 
terms “mental disorder” and “substantially probable” mean.202  Courts 
have only focused on mental disorders based on “volitional capacity” 
                                                                                                             
while the other found this chance to be only twenty-two percent); see also Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997) (noting that psychiatrists oftentimes disagree on what 
constitutes a mental illness); In re Det. of Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) 
(stating that the fields of psychiatry and psychology are riddled with disagreement over 
what constitutes a mental disorder). 
197 See Crane, 534 U.S. at 411–15 (discussing the requirements for constitutional civil 
commitment, but not establishing a precise mathematical standard); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 
356–71 (omitting discussion of any specific mathematical requirement in order to civilly 
commit a sexually violent individual); In re Det. of Hayes, 747 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2001) (noting that the United States Supreme Court did not establish a mathematical 
standard while twice upholding the “likely” standard in the Kansas Sexually Violent 
Predator Act). 
198 See supra Part III (analyzing the SVPA’s sexually violent person definition while 
focusing on the mental disorder and substantially probable language). 
199 See supra Part III.A.1 (analyzing the language currently being ignored in the SVPA’s 
mental disorder definition); supra Part III.A.2 (discussing why the DSM is not a good fit in 
the context of the law). 
200 See supra Part III.B.1 (stating that “substantially probable” is actually a higher 
standard than the “likely” standard approved by the United States Supreme Court); supra 
Part III.B.2 (discussing why “substantially probable” cannot be reduced to a specific 
percentage). 
201 See infra Part IV (discussing the improvements that can be made to the SVPA’s 
language which will increase its applicability to potential SVPs while maintaining its 
constitutionality). 
202 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/5(f) (West 2008) (defining sexually violent person). 
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when determining whether to civilly commit SVPs.203  Additionally, the 
“substantially probable” standard is actually higher than what was 
approved in Hendricks and Crane.204  This Part first proposes that 
“emotional capacity” be given meaning separate from “volitional 
capacity.”205  This Part then suggests that the Illinois legislature change 
the SVPA’s language and lower the “substantially probable” standard to 
“likely.”206 
A. Making “Emotional Capacity” Mean Something 
Illinois should be creative with the Hendricks and Crane opinions and 
give meaning to the SVPA’s “emotional capacity” language.207  If the 
“emotional capacity” language is given meaning, more SVPs could be 
covered under the SVPA and the community would be safer.208  Given 
the fact that “emotional incapacity” can be defined as the inability to 
control emotions, it follows that “emotional capacity” means the ability 
to control one’s emotions.209  Emotion refers to a state of feeling.210  
Illinois should take these definitions and apply them to SVPA civil 
commitments.211 
One approach is to argue that someone is an SVP if he feels there is 
nothing wrong with his inappropriate urges or behaviors.  Thus, if 
someone feels that sexual acts with children are acceptable behaviors 
and he has no control over that feeling, that person would qualify as an 
SVP.  This preemptive approach would look at how an individual feels, 
hopefully, before a sexually violent act takes place.  Another option is to 
allege that someone is an SVP if he is unable to control the way he feels 
after a sexual assault.  If, for example, an individual feels no remorse and 
has no control over his inability to feel remorse, that individual would 
qualify as an SVP. 
                                                 
203 See supra Part III.A.1 (critiquing how the SVPA’s “emotional capacity” language has 
been ignored). 
204 See supra Part III.B.1 (comparing “substantially probable” to “likely” in the context of 
sexual predator legislation). 
205 See infra Part IV.A (suggesting that “emotional capacity” be given meaning). 
206 See infra Part IV.B (explaining why the SVPA should utilize a “likely” standard instead 
of “substantially probable”). 
207 See infra notes 208–11 and accompanying text (explaining why Illinois should give 
meaning to the “emotional capacity” language found in the SVPA). 
208 See infra notes 209–11 and accompanying text (offering a meaning for the “emotional 
capacity” language contained in the SVPA). 
209 See supra note 120 (giving the definition of “emotional incapacity”). 
210 See supra text accompanying note 120 (defining “emotional”). 
211 See infra note 212 and accompanying text (explaining how “emotional capacity” could 
be given meaning). 
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Under either approach to the new interpretation, the individual feels 
he is doing or has done nothing wrong.  Obviously there will be some 
overlap.  If, for example, an alleged SVP is getting out of prison for 
sexually assaulting a minor, the state could argue that the individual felt 
his past act was not wrong and continues to feel that future acts of sexual 
violence would not be wrong.  If the individual has no control over these 
feelings, he would qualify as an SVP. 
This new interpretation would open the doors to civil commitments 
of a new class of SVPs:  individuals unable to control how they feel.  
Persons eligible for commitment under the SVPA would no longer be 
limited only to those unable to control how they behave.212  Thus, it 
would broaden the SVPA’s reach and keep more dangerous people off 
the streets.  This broader interpretation of the SVPA, however, would 
likely spark a constitutional challenge.  The United States Supreme Court 
has yet to decide a sexual predator case involving commitment based 
solely on an individual’s emotional capacity.213  Even if challenged, this 
new interpretation by Illinois could withstand constitutional scrutiny.214 
As an initial matter, the civil nature of the statute would not 
change.215  Retribution, one of the principal aims of criminal punishment, 
would not be accomplished.216  Even by giving “emotional capacity” 
meaning, the SVPA would still not require criminal responsibility.  As a 
result, Illinois would not be seeking retribution for past misconduct.217  
Deterrence, another goal of criminal punishment, would also not be 
accomplished.218  A person newly determined to be an SVP based on his 
emotional capacity would be unable to control how he feels, and it is 
                                                 
212 See supra notes 207–11 and accompanying text (demonstrating that a new type of SVP 
would emerge if the Illinois courts would interpret “emotional capacity” and “volitional 
capacity” as separate capacities). 
213 See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (stating that neither the Hendricks nor 
Crane opinions considered whether a civil commitment pursuant to a sexual predator law 
based solely on an individual’s emotional capacity was constitutional). 
214 See infra notes 215–25 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the new 
interpretation of the SVPA could withstand constitutional scrutiny). 
215 See infra notes 216–19 (illustrating that the SVPA would remain a civil statute even if 
“emotional capacity” were given meaning). 
216 See supra note 53 (explaining that the Hendricks opinion focused on retribution as one 
of the primary purposes of criminal punishment). 
217 See supra note 53 (noting that according to Hendricks, the Kansas Sexually Violent 
Predator Act did not require criminal responsibility, thus it was not seeking retribution for 
past misdeeds); supra note 68 (giving the SVPA’s definition of a sexually violent person and 
showing that a prior criminal conviction is not required for commitment). 
218 See supra note 53 (summarizing the Hendricks position that deterrence joins retribution 
as one of the two primary aims of criminal punishment). 
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difficult to deter someone who has no control.219  In addition, double 
jeopardy and ex post facto challenges would fail because the SVPA 
would remain civil in nature.220  All of the procedures of the SVPA 
would stay the same, so procedural due process would also be 
satisfied.221 
A substantive due process challenge would have more merit but 
would also fail.222  The class of individuals covered by the SVPA would 
remain sufficiently narrow to satisfy Hendricks.223  The class would 
consist of individuals with a mental disorder that makes those 
individuals unable to control how they feel before or after a sexually 
violent act.  This mental disorder would have to be such that the 
individual is substantially probable to be sexually violent.  The Crane 
opinion looked at a commitment based on the volitional capacity and 
decided that there must be an inability to control behavior.224  Under the 
new interpretation of the SVPA, with a commitment based on the 
emotional capacity, an inability to control feelings would be required.  
Thus, the Crane concern over some type of lack-of-control determination 
would be satisfied.225 
The Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of the SVPA’s language 
would be problematic for this new type of SVP but could also be 
                                                 
219 See supra note 53 (restating the Hendricks reasoning that individuals without control 
are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of confinement). 
220 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (describing the Hendricks analysis of double 
jeopardy and ex post facto challenges to the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act).  
According to the Hendricks Court, the Double Jeopardy Clause only applies to criminal 
punishment and the ex post facto clause pertains exclusively to penal statutes.  Kansas v. 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370 (1997). 
221 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 207/1–99 (West 2008) (stating the procedures of the 
SVPA); see also supra note 66 (summarizing the procedural requirements of the SVPA); 
supra Part II.C.2 (offering history of the SVPA’s approval in light of constitutional 
challenges). 
222 See infra notes 223–25 (stating why the new interpretation of the SVPA’s language 
would satisfy substantive due process). 
223 See supra notes 51−52 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court in Hendricks 
viewed the language in the Kansas law as constitutional because it narrowed the class of 
persons eligible for commitment to those who lacked volitional control). 
224 See supra note 56 (discussing the Crane conclusion that there must be some 
determination that the alleged sexually violent individual has serious difficulty controlling 
behavior); supra notes 60–61 (stating that neither Hendricks nor Crane discussed the 
significance of emotional capacity but were instead concerned with commitments based on 
an individual’s volitional capacity). 
225 See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing the Crane requirement of a lack-
of-control determination). 
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overcome.226  In Varner, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that the Illinois 
legislature did not intend for “emotional” and “volitional” to 
differentiate between those capable of controlling sexually violent 
behavior and those not capable of controlling sexually violent 
behavior.227  This interpretation of the SVPA could easily be overcome by 
a legislative statement saying otherwise.  The Illinois legislature could 
simply amend the SVPA to include some clarification that emotional and 
volitional do, in fact, refer to separate capacities.  It also could broaden 
the SVPA’s applicability by giving meaning to the “emotional capacity” 
language that it chose to write.  Although a new interpretation of 
existing language is one way to broaden the SVPA’s applicability, a 
slight change of the commitment standard is another way the SVPA 
could reach more dangerous individuals.228 
B. Lowering the “Substantially Probable” Standard 
The Illinois legislature should lower the “substantially probable” 
standard to the “likely” standard upheld in Hendricks and Crane.229  The 
adjusted version of the SVPA should define a sexually violent person as 
follows: 
A person who has been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually 
violent offense, or has been found not guilty of a 
sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and who is 
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental 
disorder that makes it likely that the person will engage 
in acts of sexual violence.230 
                                                 
226 See infra notes 227–28 and accompanying text (illustrating how the Varner 
determination that “emotional” capacity and “volitional” capacity both refer to the same 
capacity can be overcome by the Illinois legislature). 
227 See supra note 86 (noting that the Varner court did not believe that emotional and 
volitional referred to separate capacities); supra note 88 (analyzing the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s opinion that the Illinois legislature did not use the terms “emotional” and 
“volitional” as a way of differentiating between those capable of controlling behavior and 
those not capable of controlling behavior). 
228 See infra Part IV.B (suggesting the “substantially probable” standard be lowered to 
“likely”). 
229 See supra Part II.B (discussing Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane, the two United 
States Supreme Court cases establishing the constitutionality of modern sexual predator 
laws); supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the “likely” standard that was upheld in both Hendricks 
and Crane). 
230 See supra note 68 (giving the SVPA’s definition of a sexually violent person).  The 
italicized language is the Notewriter’s original contribution. 
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The constitutional requirements can be satisfied by using a “likely” 
standard.  The SVPA calls for an unnecessarily high standard by opting 
to use “substantially probable” in its definition of a sexually violent 
person.231  Thus, the SVPA limits itself because it uses a higher standard 
than is required.  If the “likely” standard is used instead of the 
“substantially probable” standard, then more SVPs could be found and 
committed. 
An obvious challenge to this change is that Illinois should not lower 
its standard but instead should leave the “substantially probable” 
language in place to protect the civil liberties of alleged SVPs.  The 
United States Supreme Court, however, has ruled that using a “likely” 
standard is enough to protect civil liberties.232  Thus, changing the 
standard would, according to our highest court, not infringe on 
constitutionally protected civil liberties.  If Illinois insists on being a 
champion of civil liberties, it can do so in areas of law that do not involve 
potential life-altering tragedies.  For example, prisoners could be given 
voting rights or a public speaking forum.  A child should not be raped 
and murdered simply because Illinois wants to have the sexual predator 
law most friendly to civil liberty. 
Those against changing the standard could also argue that Illinois 
should not simply fall in line with other states and that it should instead 
be given a right to experiment.  After all, the beauty of the federalist 
system is that different sovereigns can draft laws as they choose.  Public 
safety, however, should not be trumped by Illinois’s desire to 
experiment.  The current standard is unnecessarily high, and it follows 
that some dangerous individuals are not committed under the SVPA 
regime when they would be committed under sexual predator laws in 
other states. 
Another challenge to lowering the commitment standard is that 
Illinois would face funding problems.  Illinois, however, is currently the 
only state that uses “substantially probable” as the standard.233  
Numerous other states use “likely” or some variation as their standard 
and those states manage to successfully implement their sexual predator 
laws.234  If Illinois uses a higher standard than necessary as a means to 
avoid the funding required for more civil commitments, Illinois is taking 
                                                 
231 See supra Part III.B.1 (explaining that the SVPA’s “substantially probable” language is 
actually a higher standard than is constitutionally required). 
232 See supra Part II.B (discussing the key cases in establishing that sexual predator laws 
are constitutional, both of which involved a law using a “likely” standard). 
233 See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text (describing the commitment standards 
found in other statutes, none of which are “substantially probable”). 
234 See supra notes 99–100 (listing the states that use “likely” as their standard and 
explaining that Missouri actually uses “more likely than not” as its standard). 
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the position that saving money is more important than public safety.  
Illinois would also be effectively acknowledging that committing 
sexually violent individuals is not as high a priority in Illinois as it is in 
other states. 
Additionally, the funding issue is present with whatever type of SVP 
control system is used.  Sexual predator laws developed because 
communities were not satisfied with simply requiring sex offenders to 
register.235  State legislatures felt more control was needed because some 
individuals will continue to be sexually violent.236  Outpatient therapy is 
one option.237  Proponents could argue that this alleviates some of the 
burden on the state; however, the relief is small.  States are still 
responsible for supplying intensive treatment, therapy, food, facilities, 
and staff during the day.  Consequently, the issue becomes what to do 
with sexually violent individuals at night. 
If the state is not providing a place for these individuals to live, they 
must live elsewhere.  With therapy during the day, these individuals 
would be forced to work at night in order to pay for living expenses.  To 
say the least, an employer would be hesitant about hiring someone who 
is currently undergoing full-time therapy for a mental disorder that 
makes him sexually violent.  If the state were to provide job placement 
programs and some type of economic incentive for employers to hire 
SVPs, it would be an additional burden on the state.  Even if an SVP 
could somehow find work without state placement or incentive 
programs, there would be no time to sleep or do the day-to-day tasks 
that independent living requires. 
The other option is keeping these individuals in prison through 
longer sentences or habitual-offender statutes.  Prisons, however, face 
underfunding and overpopulation problems in their own right.238  While 
civil commitment programs do cost more than prison terms, the added 
cost is counter-balanced by the fact that commitment programs, 
theoretically, do not last as long because the individuals are treated and 
cured.239  An additional problem with a longer prison term is that, unless 
                                                 
235 See supra notes 30–46 and accompanying text (covering the development of sexual 
predator laws in the 1990s). 
236 See supra note 16 (averring the fact that some individuals will predictably commit 
future acts of sexual violence). 
237 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.150 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) 
(calling for outpatient treatment under a sexual predator law). 
238 See Stockinger, supra note 64 (discussing the funding issues in Illinois prisons); Garcia, 
supra note 64 (explaining that Illinois is cutting the prison budget by releasing inmates and 
laying off prison workers). 
239 See Davey & Goodnough, supra note 26 (stating that civil commitment programs cost 
an average of four times as much as keeping sexual predators in prison); supra note 44 
(explaining that modern sexual predator laws aim to treat individuals so they can be 
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it is life without parole, it ends without treatment.240  Thus, SVPs will at 
some point get out of prison and be put back on the streets with the same 
mental disorder that they had when the prison term began.  In fact, the 
Washington law that started the wave of modern sexual predator 
legislation was a reaction to a crime committed by a man who had 
recently completed his prison sentence and been released.241  The SVPA 
is one of the modern sexual predator laws passed in reaction to a broken 
system of dealing with sex offenders, and the SVPA could be improved 
through a lower commitment standard.242 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The SVPA is a successful law as it is currently written.  It has 
survived constitutional scrutiny and has been enforced countless times 
for well over a decade.  Laws must evolve, however, to ensure 
continuing success and the SVPA needs an adjustment for 2011 and 
beyond.  The adjustments proposed in Part IV are ways that the SVPA 
could be improved.  The change from “substantially probable” to 
“likely” would alter the SVPA’s language to a standard that the Illinois 
judiciary has acknowledged as being lower than what is currently in 
place.243  If Illinois were to implement this change, it would be following 
in the footsteps of other states that have already done so.  Furthermore, 
Illinois would have the opportunity to become a leader in sexual 
predator legislation if it gave meaning to the “emotional capacity” 
language.  By defining “emotional capacity” and committing SVPs 
pursuant to a mental disorder based on this capacity, Illinois could create 
a new type of SVP. 
Thinking back to the story involving Mr. Doe, let us assume that Mr. 
Doe has complete control of his behavior.244  Mr. Doe knows what he is 
doing and when he is doing it.  He chose to abduct the boy who was 
walking home.  Mr. Doe, however, made this choice because he does not 
feel there is anything wrong with sexually abusing children.  He did not 
                                                                                                             
rehabilitated and be released); supra note 66 (discussing the procedures of the SVPA, 
including a provision allowing for release upon no longer being sexually violent). 
240 Adding treatment to a prison term would create the same funding issues raised by 
opponents of sexual predator laws and would simply be a different way of doing what 
sexual predator laws already do. 
241 See supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Earl Shriner). 
242 See supra notes 30–46 (discussing the development of modern sexual predator 
legislation). 
243 See supra note 173 and accompanying text (explaining that the standard provided in 
the SVPA’s current language is at least as high, if not higher, than the standard approved in 
Hendricks). 
244 See supra Part I (discussing a hypothetical case involving a man named Mr. Doe). 
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feel there was anything wrong with tying up his stepson, nor did he feel 
he behaved badly when snatching the little-leaguer.  Mr. Doe cannot 
control why he feels this way; he simply does.  Under the new 
interpretation of the SVPA, Mr. Doe could have been found to have a 
mental disorder.  With the “substantially probable” standard lowered to 
“likely,” civilly committing Mr. Doe would have been that much easier.  
Without this interpretation and adjustment, however, Mr. Doe served his 
time and walked out of prison only to rape the eight-year-old boy 
walking home. 
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